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PREFACE 
This report presents the findings and recommendations of a re- 
search program tha t  examined the f eas ib i l i t y  of a NASA contractors Capabil- 
i t i e s  Center and cer ta in  implications fo r  Technology Util ization, i n  gen- 
e ra l ,  which were developed during the course of the investigation. 
report summarizes the findings of an ea r l i e r  preliminary report (Feasibi l i ty  
of a EJASA Contractors and Sub-contractors Capability Center - Phase I, 
Midwest Research Ins t i t u t e ,  18 August 1966) and then i n  separate sections 
presents additional findings and recommendations concerning the Capabilities 
Center design and Technology Uti l izat ion Programs. 
The 
The research was conducted as Task (09) of basic contract NASr-63 
and w a s  Midwest Research Ins t i t u t e  Project 2965-D. 
The principal investigators were Mr. Howard Gadberry and Mr. Robert 
E .  Roberts. The judgments expressed are  those of the investigators and do 
not necessarily r e f l ec t  the views of the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration or the o f f i c i a l  positions of the companies and other government 
agencies surveyed during the course of the project.  However, acknowledgement 
i s  made for  the cooperation and contributions of a number of offices,  compan- 
ies ,  and individuals without which t h i s  study could not have been made. 
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g- 
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Introduction and Methodology 
NASA's contractors a re  evolving many technical capabi l i t ies  im-  
portant t o  the achievement of space missions. 
t e n t i a l  application i n  other public and private f ie lds .  
these capabi l i t ies  through a systematized and consolidated reference f i l e  
would have immediate benefits for  NASA's procurement a c t i v i t i e s  and would 
fos te r  the diffusion of these new technologies throughout the f u l l  range 
of private and public economic endeavor. 
These capabi l i t ies  have po- 
Rapid access t o  
This report examines the f eas ib i l i t y  of a comprehensive, m u l t i -  
user, NASA Contractors Capabilities Center and se t s  for th  some ins ights  
i n to  the technology application process. These i n s i g h t s  can provide guid- 
ance t o  designers and operators of formalized technology t ransfer  programs-- 
such as  NASA's Office of Technology Util ization. 
The investigations were based on the premise tha t  a valuable and 
workable Capabilities Center would have t o  augment the existing, infornal 
system of capabili ty identification, expression, communication, and appli- 
cation. Therefore, selected NASA contractors were interviewed t o  define 
broadly the types of capabi l i t ies  they had developed, types of descriptive 
information required, major constraints t o  be recognized i n  design of the 
center, and opinions of contractors as  potent ia l  suppliers of information 
t o  the center and as potent ia l  users of the output. Subsequent investi-  
gations sought similar data from other user classes--primarily, different  
in te res t s  w i t h i n  NASA--and interpreted these findings both i n  terms of 
Center f e a s i b i l i t y  and improved management of technology t ransfer .  
Survey Findings 
The survey d isc losedtha t  contractors do not typical ly  ident i fy  
or name t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  terns of technical tasks or processes required 
i n  the performance of contracts. 
point and named capabi l i t ies  i n  terms of the item or service f ina l ly  de- 
l ivered t o  the buyer. 
cluded a number of nontechnical, organizational, and control procedures 
which the contractors believed were important i n  the supplier selection 
process. Consequently, the process of capabili ty ident i f icat ion and ex- 
pression was found t o  be extremely d i f f i c u l t  and complex, and presented 
formidable conceptual and information processing problems. Among the spe- 
c i f i c  findings were: 
Instead, they adopted an "outside" view- 
I n  t h e i r  capabili ty statements contractors a l so  i n -  
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* Contractors' capabilities are identifiable, but they are not 
necessarily identifiable in a form usefUl in a reference file. 
* Capabilities are not viewed in a technical frame of reference. 
They are not defined as abilities to perform discrete technical tasks or 
named in accordance with required technical actions or described simply as 
mixes of technical resources. 
* Contractors see capabilities in market-oriented, company goal- 
conditioned ways. Like all business, aerospace contractors must be con- 
cerned with perpetuating the firm and earning a profit. Capabilities are 
addressed to these ends and capability statements are an integral and im- 
portant part of the marketing process. Within this limit, company goals 
condition the visibility of capabilities, the importance attached to them, 
and the problems to which they are addressed. 
* Capabilities are mission-directed and organismic. Capabili- 
ties represent a combination of component elements having a value or utility 
greater than the sum of the parts. 
expressed or implied need. 
be specified prior to the development of a useful capability statement. 
They are assembled in response to an 
Since they are tailor-made, an objective must 
* Contractors have difficulty expressing their capabilities ab- 
stractly without a reference point. Even with a reference point, capabil- 
ity expression is a difficult task. As a result, contractors have evolved 
a marketing procedure that is very personal, depends upon technical inter- 
faces, and avoids explicit capability statement. 
* 
Capabilities and capability components not important to the 
Capabilities are expressed in order of importance to market 
success. 
achievement of company goals tend to be ignored and are often not exploited. 
* Capability description often includes the following informa- 
tion: 
we do it with. Contractors concentrate on making their capabilities known 
to present customers and often fail to see needs outside the aerospace 
market, to which their capabilities could be addressed. 
what we know how to do, how we control what we do, and the resources 
* Definition of capability is conditioned by the nature of a 
contractor's business--size of the firm, systems vs. components, research 
vs. production. 
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Implications for  a Capabilities Center 
Information characterizing contractors'  capabi l i t ies  of a l l  
types could be handled wi th in  a single general p u r p s e  f i l e  to serve the 
needs of multiple users. 
statements furnished by contractors do not necessarily render the infor- 
mation incompatible. Because of these differences,however, the input in -  
formation would require additional analysis and processing; the data f i l e ,  
index structure and terminology controls must be larger and more complex, 
and special  routines f o r  r e t r i eva l  would need to be developed. 
Differences i n  format and language of c a p b i l i t y  
Broad, multi-purpose capabili ty f i l e s  do not appear j u s t i f i ab le  
a t  the present time because such a center would involve costs, both to NASA 
and to NASA contractors, which outweigh the benefits  to most users over the 
methods presently employed. 
A more specialized NASA Contractor Capabilities Center designed 
primarily to support and enhance Technology Uti l izat ion ac t iv i t i e s  i s  sug- 
gested as  a more a t t rac t ive  al ternate:  a f i l e  of rare  or unique capabili- 
t i e s .  -
An inventory of NASA contractors' capabi l i t ies  representing novel, 
rare,  new, or unique a b i l i t i e s  to solve problems would both complement and 
augment Technology Uti l izat ion Division e f for t s  i n  technology transfer.  
Such a "regis t ry  of rare  capabili t ies" would a i d  NASA i n  f ive  areas: 
a. Monitoring of technical needs; 
b. Identification of innovations; 
c. Documentation of s t a t e  -of -the-art surveys, as well a s  
individual innovations; 
d. 
e. Assessment of benefits  from technology transfer.  
Matching of innovations or capabi l i t ies  with needs; 
Technology Transfer Implications 
NASA's contractors are continually engaged i n  developing, adapting, 
accepting, and u t i l i z ing  new technologies. The procedures which they have 
adopted; t h e i r  views of ca-pabilities; t he i r  behavior wi th  respect to capa- 
b i l i t y  development, application, and marketing; the constraints which ac t  
upon t h i s  process; plus related matters--all have relevance f o r  the enhance- 
ment of existing technology t ransfer  programs and the design of new approaches. 
High technology u t i l i za t ion  leverage could be obtained through 
programs providing three elements: 
t o  which capabi l i t ies  can be addressed; ( 2 )  a suff ic ient  incentive to make 
( 1) an ident i f ied non-space problem 
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the undertaking worthwhile ; and ( 3) an environment f ac i l i t a t i ng  face-to- 
face interchanges between the possessors of unsatisfied non-space needs 
and possessors of aerospace induced capabili t ies.  NASA's BiomedicalAp- 
plication Team program i s  one current effor t  that follows t h i s  general ap- 
proach. 
more act ive and d i rec t  roles as  t ransfer  agents by programs based on 
"demand pull." 
There i s  promise tha t  NASA contractors can be encouraged t o  play 
Only a fract ion of space contractors' capabi l i t ies  are  reported 
t o  EASA under the provisions of the New Technology Reporting Clause. This 
occurs because few capabi l i t ies  are developed solely for  NASA and because 
capabi l i t ies  a re  complex and are not viewed i n  a way tha t  produces report- 
able "items." 
age t ransfer  without going through existing technology reporting procedures. 
Thus, consideration should be given t o  programs t h a t  encour- 
For individual firms the cost of obtaining information about 
t ransfer  opportunities often deters application. Economies of scale can 
be achieved by developing such information a t  a single source and then 
dis t r ibut ing it t o  a l l  potentially interested par t ies .  
We conclude that t ransfer  programs concentrating on "demand 
pull" would effect ively complement programs keyed t o  "technology push." 
We recommend that NASA, i n  cooperation with other public agencies, private 
associations, and foundations, consider the development and dissemination 
of "non-space need" (market opportunity) information as an inducement fo r  
transfer.  This could be done i n  much the same m y  that technology infor- 
mation i s  now developed and disseminated. 
Finally, it appears that f o m a l  technology u t i l i za t ion  programs 
can benefit  from more knowledge about the normal process whereby technology 
i s  transferred and applied. 
o f fe r  a research framework hypothesis, and suggest specific types of i n -  
vestigation. 
We recommend further research on the process, 
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11. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
I n  recent years NASA has levied many advanced requirements on 
American industries.  The response i n  a l l  f ie lds--scient i f ic ,  technological, 
manufacturing, and management--is a matter of record. The success of the 
response i s  a t tes ted  t o  by the successful completion of a number of NASA 
programs and rapid progress i n  other, even more advanced, programs. 
faction of space exploration requirements has necessitated many state-of- 
the-art advances which have been incorporated in to  the s k i l l  inventories 
of NASA's contractors and subcontractors. 
Sat is-  
To real ize  the f u l l  potent ia l  of these new and augmented indus- 
t r i a l  capabi l i t ies ,  NASA has undertaken a number of steps t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
further t he i r  application w i t h i n  NASA's primary mission areas and their  
use i n  satisfying other public and private needs. T h i s  report i s  the 
product of one such step. 
It presents the findings of a study t h a t  explored the f eas ib i l i t y  
of a Capabilities Center t ha t  would catalog and provide reference services 
for  the specific technical capabi l i t ies  possessed by NASA's contractors and 
the i r  sub-contractors. NASA was par t icular ly  interested i n  the reference 
center 's  potent ia l  a s  a mechanism for  furthering the application of space 
technology i n  other f ie lds .  However, the Center was t o  be designed t o  serve 
a broad range of NASA and other users. Included among the potent ia l  NASA 
users who have need of capabili ty information were the procurement offices,  
the program offices,  the NASA centers, and of course, the Technology U t i l i -  
zation Office, Other potent ia l  users included government agencies, the 
contractors themselves, non-aerospace industry which might make use of NASA 
contractor capabi l i t ies ,  as well as other private interests .  
B. Methodology 
The study plan employed a two-phase research program. The first 
phase was a p i l o t  survey of selected contractors t o  define broadly the types 
of capabi l i t ies  t o  be cataloged, the types of descriptive information re- 
quired, and the major constraints which had t o  be given recognition i n  the 
design Center. Phase I l w a s  t o  progress t o  the specification of design c r i -  
t e r i a  fo r  the Center, including: the type or types of cataloging systems, 
the data t o  be provided w i t h  respect t o  each entry indexed, controls on 
access, the geographical location of the Center, and information on how the 
Center might mesh with existing reference sources. 
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Nine companies were surveyed during the course of Phase I. The 
sample was selected t o  provide a mixture of large and small firms; prime 
and sub-contractors; and component, hardware, software, systems; and RSCD 
contractors. A wide geographical dis t r ibut ion of firms was  a l so  sought. 
The specific firms selected were: 
Research Corporation; Electro-Optical Systems, Inc.; Excelco Development 
Inc.; General Electric Company - Missiles and Space Systems Division; Gen- 
e r a l  Precision, Inc. - Systems Division; Honeywell, Inc. - Aeronautical 
Division; and Statham Instruments, Inc. 
Arinc Research Corporation; Ball Brothers 
Each company was interviewed i n  depth. Topics discussed included-- 
b u t  were not limited to--the following: 
1. The types of special  capabili t ies t ha t  the contractor had 
developed or enhanced through NASA work. 
2. The circumstances surrounding the achievement of these capa- 
abil i t ies--i .e. ,  why the capabi l i t ies  were developed, 
3. Other NASA and non-NASA uses t o  which these capabi l i t ies  had 
been put, 
4. Current sources or methods used i n  identifying the specialized 
capabi l i t ies  of others and the a t t r ibu tes  and l imitations of these existing 
sources. 
5. Opinions regarding the proposed Capabilities Center, including 
an  assessment of the value t o  the contractors (both as  suppliers of infor- 
mation and potent ia l  users of the output), of experience with other f i l e s  
and regis ters  of capabili t ies,  t h e i r  willingness t o  participate,  and problems 
or d i f f i cu l t i e s  anticipated. 
The interview findings disclosed a number of practices and tenden- 
c ies  on the par t  of contractors that  might severely r e s t r i c t  the u t i l i t y ,  
pract ical i ty ,  and f eas ib i l i t y  of the originally planned Capabilities Center. 
Many of these factors s temed from the nature of "capability," as the con- 
t rac tors  define the term. It turned out that contractors did not typically 
ident i fy  or name t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  terns  of technical tasks or processes 
required i n  the performance of contracts. Instead, they adopted an  "outside" 
viewpoint--they named t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  terms of the item o r  service 
that they f ina l ly  delivered t o  the buyer. They a l so  included i n  t h e i r  cap- 
a b i l i t y  statements a number of nontechnical, organizational, and control 
procedures which they believed were important i n  the suppliers selection 
process employed by buyers. Consequently, capabili ty ident i f icat ion and ex- 
pression w a s  found t o  be a n  extremely d i f f i c u l t  and complex process which 
presented both conceptual and information processing problems not or iginal ly  
considered, While NASA contractors were found t o  possess a n  impressive range 
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of capabi l i t ies ,  some of the unexpected findings--e.g., about the origin 
of new capabi l i t ies ,  the ways i n  which contractors look a t  t h e i r  own capa- 
b i l i t i e s ,  and the question of whether capabi l i t ies  a re  fu l ly  exploited-- 
indicated that the or iginal  concept of a NASA Contractors Capabilities 
Center should be re-examined. 
C. Phase I1 
A s  a r e su l t  of the findings, questions raised, and new opportun- 
i t i e s  suggested by the p i l o t  survey, NASA's project monitors requested that 
design planning f o r  a Capabilities Center be postponed. Instead we were 
asked t o  take additional steps t o  test  the va l id i ty  and generali ty of the 
major hypotheses derived from the previous survey. This took the form of 
a limited number of additional interviews and a review and analysis of rele- 
vant l i t e r a tu re .  Potential  NASA users of the Center were a l so  contacted t o  
provide the i r  views on the u t i l i t y  and des i rab i l i ty  of the Center. A f i n a l  
portion of the redirected study was aimed a t  a n  analysis of a number of 
findings which promised a basis fo r  be t te r  understanding of the process 
whereby technology i s  u t i l i zed  i n  new ways or applied t o  new problems. Such 
an examination might lead t o  new approaches t o  the t ransfer  of NASA technol- 
ogy and/or improved effectiveness i n  exis t ing Technology Uti l izat ion Programs. 
The balance of t h i s  report s e t s  for th  our  findings with respect 
t o  the ways i n  which contractors view the i r  capabi l i t ies .  
the implications of these views fo r  the Capabilities Center, and the design 
of approaches t o  speed the t ransfer  of technology. 
We discuss both 
The findings are presented i n  four basic sections. The f i r s t  i s  
a review and expansion of Phase I findings. It lays the foundation fo r  the 
following sections. The second presents implications from our findings for  
a successful Capabilities Center. The third contains implications for  Tech- 
nology Uti l izat ion i n  general. 
i n  the Final  Section. 
Conclusions and recommendations a re  presented 
111. SUMMARY OF PHASE I FINDINGS 
This section of the report presents a summary of the findings of 
These findings form the basis for  a l a t e r  discussion of the im- Phase I. 
plications concerning the design of a successful Capabilities Center and i t s  
potent ia l  usefulness, as well as  suggestions relat ing t o  technology-utiliza- 
t ion program modification. 
on the findings of Phase I1 research. 
The discuss-ion of each finding i s  based, i n  part ,  
A. Contractors Do Have Ident i f iable  Capabilities 
The conclusion that contractors have developed impressive capa- 
b i l i t i e s ,  and that these capabi l i t ies  can be ident i f ied,  i s  fundamental 
7 
to a l l  others, and was not unexpected. However, the f ac t  tha t  contractors have 
ident i f iable  capabi l i t ies  does not necessarily mean they are d i rec t ly  
ident i f iable  i n  a form useful i n  a Capabilities Center. I n  most instances 
the capabi l i t ies  are not s t a t i c  but are continually being developed and 
extended. NASA programs and funding have played, and continue to play, 
important roles  i n  t h i s  process. However, only ra re ly  w i l l  contractors 
admit tha t  t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  are d i rec t ly  or solely traceable to NASA. 
More typically,  capabi l i t ies  are said to have been brought in to  being 
through a conzbination of company, NASA, A i r  Force, and other government 
agency funding. To some extent, t h i s  may r e f l ec t  concern on the par t  of 
the contractors w i t h  NASA patent policies,  i . e . ,  i f  the company can show 
that sources of funding other than NASA were important i n  the develop- 
gent of the capability, then it may be able to re ta in  a proprietary 
posit ion o r  patents associated therewith. 
NASA's patent policies are a major consideration i n  the reluctance of 
companies t o  specify a specif ic  source of the capability. Instead, it 
appears that  capabili ty development i s  an on-going and integral  par t  of 
being i n  the space industries.  New capabi l i t ies  are  most frequently said 
t o  be the resu l t  of corporate response t o  a need implicit  (or expl ic i t ly  
stated) i n  the requirements of advanced government programs. 
are rarely developed t o  support any single requirement or to solve a 
specific technical problem encountered i n  the course of a program. 
short, capabi l i t ies  are  usually developed i n  response to a recurring problem, 
or a problem tha t  i s  generic to a number of programs which offers  significant 
market opportunity. 
Hawever, we do not believe tha t  
Capabilities 
I n  
Although more w i l l  be said on t h i s  point l a t e r ,  capabi l i t ies  are 
typical ly  composites. 
ment, or a part icular  s e t  of sk i l led  personnel. Instead, capabi l i t ies  are 
sets of resources (including the preceding plus many others) t ha t  are ad- 
dressed t o  some par t icular  end. 
between l a t en t  capabi l i t ies  and capabi l i t ies  i n  being. 
the outside s t i m u l u s  of a n  expressed or perceived customer need or simple 
competitive pressure has been applied to the company which i n  turn reacts 
by marshalling i t s  resources ( i t s  la ten t  capabili ty bank) in to  a capabili ty 
i n  being . 
A capabili ty i s  not a f a c i l i t y ,  or a piece of equip- 
As a r e su l t ,  it i s  possible t o  dist inguish 
For the l a t t e r  type, 
B. Capabilities Are Not Viewed i n  a Technical Frame of Reference 
Contractors do not define their  capabi l i t ies  i n  terms of a b i l i t i e s  
t o  perform discrete technical tasks. 
ance w i t h  the specific technical actions required, nor are  they described 
simply i n  terms of the mix of technical resources--people, equipment and fa- 
c i l i t ies--required t o  perform the task. I n  addition, few capabi l i t ies  are 
described i n  terms of technical functions; instead, the focus i s  on the 
commodities delivered as end items. 
Capabilities are  not named i n  accord- 
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This lack of focus on the "technical" o r  methodological aspects 
of capability, par t icular ly  i n  view of the importance of technical task 
accomplishment i n  aerospace industry, may seem surprising. The re la t ive  
lack of emphasis on the technical aspects of technical capabi l i t ies ,  how- 
ever, is  a product of normal business behavior. 
s e l l  highly sophisticated, advanced technology goods and services to NASA 
and the  defense establishments, the performance of technical tasks i s  only 
one of several  types of a c t i v i t i e s  that must  be accomplished s k i l l f u l l y  i f  
the f i r m  i s  t o  be successful. A company's success i n  the aerospace indus- 
t r i e s ,  as i n  other industries,  requires the sat isfactory performance of a 
number of functions, including design, production, marketing, planning, and 
control, finance, and dis t r ibut ion.  Elements of each of  these a re  included 
by contractors identifying the i r  capabi l i t ies .  This i s  par t icular ly  t rue 
of adaptations they have made t o  sa t i s fy  the peculiar requirements of the 
aerospace market. Thus, companies are  par t icular ly  aware of t he i r  s k i l l s  
i n  scheduling, planning of complex operations, procedures f o r  maintaining 
rapport w i t h  the technical customer, and other s k i l l s  supporting the de- 
l i v e r y  t o  the customer of t he i r  highly technical products or services. 
Even though the contractors 
Contractors often refused t o  s t r e s s  technical factors i n  describ- 
ing t h e i r  capabi l i t ies .  Their response, i n  effect ,  was: "You've got it a l l  
wrong. 
we can s e l l ,  we can make. 
t h e  things we do i n  order t o  maximize the a b i l i t y  t o  s e l l  t o  our chosen 
markets. 
technical s k i l l s .  
I t ' s  not t ha t  anything we can make we can se l l - - i t ' s  t ha t  anything 
The important par ts  of OUT capabi l i t ies  are  a l l  
Only when we do these things f irst ,  are we able t o  u t i l i z e  our 
C .  Contractors See Capabilities i n  Market-Oriented, Company Goal-Conditioned 
Ways 
Aerospace f i rms, l ike a l l  private enterprise,  are fundamentally 
interested i n  perpetuating themselves and making p ro f i t .  This seems t o  be 
par t icular ly  t rue with large investor-awned firms. 
(and judged) fo r  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  insure that  the company stays i n  business 
and provides a t  l ea s t  a reasonable return t o  the investor. 
equally well  t o  companies engaged i n  technologically prosaic industries o r  
i n  high-technology space industries.  
Management i s  responsible 
This applies 
A company cannot be profitable unless it makes sales .  I t s  capabil- 
i t i e s  are addressed t o  t h i s  end. 
successful unless it can supply and s e l l  a product that satisfies consumer 
wants. 
means t o  the end: the sale,  and ultimately the prof i t .  The same holds fo r  
the space industries.  The product o r  service they provide and the technical 
An appliance manufacturer w i l l  not be 
The product and the means of manufacturing and dis t r ibut ing are a l l  
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s k i l l s  or  capabili t ies employed are again means t o  the end of achieving sales  
and f ina l ly  prof i t s .  
Capability statements are conceived and expressed with these fac ts  
i n  mind and are an integral  and important part  of the marketing process. 
This s i tuat ion causes the company t o  see i t s  capabili t ies i n  a much d i f fe r -  
ent l igh t  than would be the case i f  these economic considerations were not 
present. Thus, capabili t ies are market-oriented and are perceived as being 
different from an internal-ski l ls  inventory of a company, which would focus 
on elements and functions rather  than on the result ing marketable product. 
The internal-ski l ls  inventory i s  not a capability statement, but rather a 
statement of the pool of resources t o  be drawn upon t o  accomplish a techni- 
ca l  task. The internal-ski l ls  inventory can be used t o  work up a production 
plan, which i s  one step closer ko a capability: the plan represents a 
marshalling and organization of resources t o  accomplish a technical objec- 
t ive.  But a production plan i s  only one sub-set of a capabili ty and the 
technical objective i s  not the ultimate objective. 
cludes contributions from a l l  the other normal business functions--market- 
ing, distribution, finance, management, support services, etc.,--formed t o  
produce' sales and provide prof i ts .  
A capability a lso in- 
Not a l l  companies are motivated solely by economic factors.  A t  
l eas t  three of the companies we talked t o  were strongly impelled by non- 
economic forces, and saw the i r  reason f o r  being--and obtained the i r  s a t i s -  
factions from being--at the front iers  of science and technology. But even 
i n  these cases the economic r ea l i t i e s  placed powerful constraints on what 
they undertook and haw they went about t he i r  work. Even these f i r m s  which 
were predisposed t o  view the i r  capabili t ies i n  a limited technological way 
were forced t o  view and express the i r  capabili t ies i n  a market-oriented way. 
Within the broad context of a market-oriented view of capabili t ies,  
company goals affect  the v i s i b i l i t y  of capabili t ies possessed by a firm, 
the importance attached t o  them, and the problems t o  which they are ad- 
dressed. For example, one company saw i t s e l f  as basically a sc ien t i f ic  en- 
terpr ise .  It sought research and development contracts, sometimes followed 
by limited production of the resulting hardware. 
production contracts. I n  fac t ,  fromtime t o  time it had diverted t o  other 
organizations several products which had reached the volwne production s t a t e .  
The company had strong potential  manufacturing capabili t ies,  but these were 
not exploited because such exploitation would have been i n  conflict  w i t h  
basic company goals. The manufacturing s k i l l s  were regularly employed i n  
the conduct of t he i r  operations--but they were viewed as supporting skills. 
Because'the f i r m  did not view i t s e l f  as a manufacturing company, major market 
or goal changes would be required before these manufacturing s k i l l s  could be 
deve,loped into a major capability. 
It did not seek volume 
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Another company viewed i t s e l f  as a high-technology, component 
supplier, and avoided R&D contracts which might t a i n t  i t s  patent position. 
The differ ing goals of the two companies produced radically d i f -  
ferent views of the capabi l i t ies .  I n  addition, the two companies aimed 
the i r  marketing e f fo r t s  at  two different  customer segments. The f irst  
maintained extensive contact w i t h  research buyers , and the second concen- 
t ra ted  on hardware buyers. 
D. Capabilities Are Mission-Directed and Organismic Y 
Contractors do not view t h e i r  ski l ls  as capabi l i t ies  u n t i l  they 
are gathered together t o  s a t i s fy  some mission. In  addition, capabi l i t ies  
are a combination of component elements with a value or u t i l i t y  greater 
than the sum of the par ts .  I n  our discussions w i t h  various contractors, 
we t r i e d  very hard t o  get the interviewees t o  reduce the i r  capabi l i t ies  to 
fundamental elements t ha t  are discrete ,  eas i ly  named, functional, and con- 
se quently comparatively easy t o  catalog o r  index. Contractor representa- 
t ives  inevitably res i s ted  t h i s  kind of capabili ty formulation. They con- 
s i s t en t ly  expressed the i r  capabili ty at a higher leve l  than the process 
elements, f a c i l i t i e s ,  knuwledge, organization, e t c .  For example, we would 
attempt t o  get an opt ical  instruments manufacturer t o  express h is  capabil- 
i t i e s  i n  terms of designing, generating, and figuring opt ical  elements, 
precision machining, assembling, collimating, and tes t ing .  His response, 
however, would be tha t  his company's capabili ty w a s  " s t e l l a r  navigation 
devices." By so responding, contractors were t e l l i n g  us a t  l ea s t  three 
things : 
F i r s t ,  capabili t ies ex is t  at a higher, more complex leve l  than 
the component elements t ha t  must be combined t o  produce a capability. 
Second, an objective must be specified before a capabili ty can 
be assembled. This means tha t  s k i l l s  fo r  which there are  no known needs 
(markets) are not capabilities--because t o  the contractor the capabili t ies 
must be salable. Either the customer must s t a t e  t ha t  he has an unsatisfied 
need, o r  the company m u s t  perceive tha t  the customer has an unsatisfied 
need, before the contractor can assemble the capability. 
gether of a capabili ty depends upon where a contractor starts. 
can inclpde a l l  or  some of the following: focusing upon and mentally 
identifying a potent ia l  capability, (b) generating and naming a capability 
which speaks t o  the market need by re la t ive ly  minor a l terat ions of an 
existing capabili ty and/or (c) actual  mobilizing and organizing a new 
capabili ty from a resource bank plus the acquisit ion of new capabili ty 
elements from outside the company. 
The putting-to- 
Assembly 
(a) 
For confirmation, see: Howard Reiss and Jack Balderston, "The Userulness 
of Scient is ts  , I '  Internat5onal Science and Technology, May 1966, pp. 38-44, 
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Third, the components or  elements of capabili ty are not limited 
t o  technical s k i l l s  alone, but a lso include the s k i l l s  necessary t o  get 
the business i n  the first place, and then t o  organize and control the appli- 
cation of the technical skil ls  t o  the achievement of the market-defined 
mission. 
E.  Contractor's View of Capabilities Defines Behavior 
Behavioral character is t ics  of contractors stem from t h e i r  view 
of capability, and even more fundamentally from the forces tha t  shape t h e i r  
views of capability. These behavioral characterist ics have a number of 
significant implications fo r  the Capabilities Center and for  the design of 
technology-transfer programs. 
I. Contractors have d i f f i cu l ty  expressing the i r  capabi l i t ies  
abstract ly  without a reference point. 
the sheer abundance of t a l en t  possessed by many contractors. More important, 
the way they do business ( i . e . ,  assemble the i r  t a l en t s  t o  s a t i s fy  a specific 
need) does not require tha t  they learn haw t o  state capabili ty abstractly.  
Finally, general l i s t i n g s  of elemental s k i l l s  which make up capabili ty are 
not compatible with the organismic nature of capability. 
capabili ty in to  i t s  par ts  may make the capabili ty unrecognizable and would 
certainly undervalue it. For example, Statham Instruments has a rare  
capabili ty i n  Thin Film Transducer Technology. 
making up t h i s  capabili ty are: 
To some extent t h i s  i s  a result of 
Dissecting a 
The major technical elements 
. Substrate finishing t o  opt ical  surface quality, 
. Multiple vacuum deposition--dielectric ceramic, s t r a i n  gage 
alloy, and lead elements, 
. Ultra-precise lead-wire welding, 
Integrated electronics,  
. Accelerated aging and s tabi l izat ion techniques, 
. Materials know-how--alloys, seals, ,and d ie lec t r ics ,  and 
. Performance of these operations a t  a microminiature scale. 
Although somewhat sophisticated, none of these elements i s  unique. 
t he i r  combined application t o  transducers is: the transducer produced rep- 
resents a radical  departure from t rad i t iona l  s t r a i n  gage design and produc- 
t ion; and the performance i n  t e r n  of precision and operating environment 
i s  dramatically improved. 
HMever, 
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The d i f f i cu l t i e s  associated with abstract  capabili ty statements 
cause the contractors t o  view with alarm requirements imposed on them by vari-  
ous governmental customers fo r  before-the-fact, nonproject related,  overall  
capabili ty statements. Several agencies now require such statements. The 
contractors f e e l  tha t  they are not used; that they are r ea l ly  not usable; 
tha t  there i s  much duplication; and they certainly do not want t h i s  study 
to r e su l t  i n  another system having the same fau l t s .  
2. Even with a reference point, capabili ty expression is  a 
d i f f i c u l t  task.  The complex nature of capabili ty makes t h i s  the case. The 
fac t  tha t  reference points (Requests for  Proposals and the l i ke )  are often 
somewhat vague i s  a further complication. Contractors believe tha t  they 
must read between the l ines  t o  ident i fy  what  the buyer r ea l ly  wants and then 
form the capabili ty statement accordingly. Further proof of the d i f f i cu l ty  
of the task i s  found i n  the variety of crutches used by contractors i n  dis- 
cussing the i r  capabi l i t ies .  
" O u r  capabili ty i s  . . . ." Instead they w i l l  continue w i t h ,  "By tha t  I 
mean . . . ., and we have applied t h i s  capabili ty t o  the following programs 
. .  * ,  . . . , . . . , i n  the past." Description i n  terms of the output 
from a capabili ty (the result ing product) i s  an even more common means of 
circumventing an expl ic i t  capabili ty statement. Finally, the meaningful 
expression of capabili ty seems to require that the presentation be made 
to a technically qualified audience. 
They ra re ly  make a single statement such as,  
3. Contractors have evolved a marketing procedure which i s  very 
personal, depends upon technical interfaces,  and avoids expl ic i t  capabili ty 
statement. 
c a l  people. The s e l l e r ' s  representative continually cult ivates the buyer's 
representative i n  an attempt to keep abreast of the buyer's requirements 
long before specific WP's are issued. I n  f ac t ,  the interchange of informa- 
t i on  between the two i s  reputed to be a significant a id  to the process 
whereby the buyer determines exactly w h a t  tasks he wants t o  undertake. 
All contractors indicated tha t  t h i s  cult ivation w a s  absolutely necessary 
to t h e i r  continued success. 
believe t h a t  t h e i r  chances of gett ing the job are s l i m .  
I n  th i s  process both buyer and s e l l e r  are represented by techni- 
If they waited for the issuance of an RFP, they 
The interaction between technical representatives of the buyer and 
s e l l e r  i s  said to work l ike  this:  Using the i r  technical backgrounds, the 
two are able to discuss existing hardware characterist ics and t ranslate  
these in to  modifications and advances required t o  perform the new mission 
which the buyer has i n  mind. From t h i s  background the se l l e r ' s  man draws  
implicit  conclusions as to the capabi l i t ies  required to accomplish the job, 
or  produce the new piece of hardware. 
company's past hardware work tha t  demonstrate the company's capabili ty t o  
supply the desired item. 
i t i e s  by t ranslat ing the tendered hardware examples back in to  capability. 
Then, he draws examples from his 
The buyer's man then judges the company's capabil- 
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Again, the t ranslat ion i s  intui t ive.  Note tha t  t h i s  process avoids the 
d i f f i c u l t  task of expl ic i t ly  foraulating and presenting capabili ty s ta te -  
ments, and tha t  t h i s  i s  accomplished through a close personal interface 
between members of the technical f ra te rn i ty .  
Before the contract i s  l e t ,  a l l  the formal wri t ten steps are of 
course taken. But a l l  contractors surveyed believe tha t  t h i s  i s  laxgely 
a f t e r  the fac t ;  i . e . ,  the buyer has largely made up h is  mind about who i s  
best  qualified t o  get the job based on previous discussions. 
None of the contractors surveyed believed tha t  t h i s  personal 
phase of sel l ing (capabili ty presentation) could be replaced by a computer- 
based Capability Center. However, a l l  indicated tha t  the existing process 
was expensive and wished tha t  something could be done t o  assist the process 
and thus cut costs.  
4. Contractors express t h e i r  capabili t ies i n  order of importance 
t o  market success. This tendency i s  very important because it can often ob- 
scure t rue technical capabi l i t ies .  
b i l i t y  i s  t o  mobilize and manage a bank of resources (primarily expressed as 
people i n  a broad range of special t ies)  t o  yield an operating payload hard- 
ware system of a b o s t  any type the customer requests. A l l  t he i r  wealth of 
technical s k i l l s  are  subordinate t o  t h i s  overall  capabili ty.  
TRW Systems finds i t s  principal capa- 
ARINC Research Corporation indicated that  i t s  most important single 
capabili ty was i t s  impart ia l i ty  and lack  of bias;  more expl ic i t ly  i t s  a b i l i t y  
t o  t r u l y  and objectively represent the in t e re s t  of i t s  customers. This i s  
obviously a nontechnical feature,  bu t  given the type of work done by the 
company, it i s  of fundamental importance i n  gett ing business. 
operates for  i t s  governmental customers as a s t a f f  expert i n  systems effec- 
tiveness. When so contracting for  i t s  government customers, i t s  position i s  
analogous t o  that  of the Aerospace Corporation except t ha t  the area of ex- 
per t i se  is  narrower. Violation of confidences tendered by e i ther  the custo- 
mer o r  the company, whose product or processes were being examined from a re- 
l i a b i l i t y  viewpoint by ARINC Research, would be disastrous t o  the future of 
ARINC Research. 
will not get t o  apply its recognized strong analyt ical  technical capabi l i t ies .  
ARINC Research 
If confidence and in tegr i ty  are  not maintained, the company 
Ball  Brothers Research Corporation and another f i r m  stress the i r  
capabi l i t ies  i n  systems management and systems engineering because of customer 
influences b u t  for  a-somewhat different  reason than ARINC Research. I n  the 
case of these two companies, t he i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  the above areas came about 
as "fixes" which were necessary t o  improve the i r  market positions. 
Brothers Research s ta r ted  out quite small, grew rapidly, and f ina l ly  found 
tha t  coherency of e f f o r t  was jeopardized under the then exis t ing organization. 
The company therefore reorganized on a program basis so as to,provide a sub- 
s t an t i a l ly  be t te r  framework for  systems management. 
d i t iona l  supplier of rather sophiqticated components t o  the a i r c r a f t  industry, 
Ball 
The ohher f i rm,  a t r a -  
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found that it was losing sales as the aircraft industry evolved into the 
aerospace industry. The apparent reason was that the marketing game had 
changed as the demands of aerospace placed more emphasis on integrated 
systems. Thus, to sell components, the firm was forced to move into sys- 
tems engineering. 
have added significant--perhaps vital capabilities. 
Both companies feel that these adaptations to the market 
5. Contractors tend to ignore or fail to exploit capabilities 
and capability components that are not important to the achievement of 
company goals. 
ordinate and necessary to its overall Thin Film Transducer Capability. 
ever, it would be unlikely for the company to actively seek business in one 
of these areas unless the new business area was consistent with the company's 
goals or market missions. 
Statham has a number of processing capabilities that are sub- 
How- 
Our visit to Electro-optical Systems was made just after its ac- 
quisition by the Xerox Corporation--before Xerox goals and market philos- 
ophy had pervaded the organization. Company goals still mirrored the in- 
terests and motivations of EOS's founder, Dr. Abe Zarem--one of this nation's 
outstanding scientists. The company viewed its great strengths as being 
in basic scientific phenomenological research and subsequent development 
addressed to the problems associated with unmanned spacecraft. Time and 
again during the interview at EOS, examples were called out wherein items 
with market potential had been carried through the small lot production 
stage, and then either abandoned, or a manufacturing subsidiary created to 
exploit the more mass market. 
was not a manufacturing company; its strength lay elsewhere; and conse- 
quently it did not intend to dilute its effort by engaging in off-the-shelf 
manufacturing. 
The reason given in each case was that EOS 
Now, two years later, the goals of EOX have been markedly altered 
through a combination of Xerox ownership and market pressure, i.e., the re- 
search market has contracted and the military hardware market has expanded. 
Major changes in the company's view of its capabilities and their applica- 
tion have followed. EOS retains its research excellence but this is not 
an end in itself. 
hardware in high obsolescence mass market areas. Scientific 1 research is 
conducted in support of this manufacturing function. 
Today, emphasis is on the manufacture of operational 
Honeywell is another example. This firm has explicitly carved 
out areas of primary interest to the company and established goals in each. 
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All company activities are geared to attaining these goa1s.g Such a policy 
exemplifies the excellent management and control for which Honeywell is 
well known and is obviously beneficial to existing customers (they can 
count on the maintenance and further development of the \capabilities they 
buy from Honeywell), but it also inhibits the acceptance of unplanned for, 
tangential, walk-in-the-door business to which Honeywell's capabilities 
might be addressed. 
As the preceding illustrations indicate, company goals exert a 
powerful influence on a company's view of its capabilities. 
this view severely inhibits the application of capabilities in new 1 areas. 
However, this limitation is not so strong that it cannot be overcome, if 
sufficient market potential is demonstrated to warrant goal reevaluation. 
Such was the case with Statham in its move into medical instrumentation 
and electronics. Market forces were also important in the Electro-Optical 
Systems product line shift, But the companies do appear to be reluctant 
to respond to one-time, tangential business for their subordinate capabil- 
ities such as might be referred to them by the Center. 
In many cases 
6. Contractors include nontechnical as well as technical factors 
in describing their capabilities. Examples of this tendency at ARINC and 
Ball Brothers were noted earlier. The reason is that nontechnical factors 
often control who gets the contract--particularly when the choice is among 
relatively technical equals. 
complete capability description would include the following types of in- 
formation: 
Thus, 1 the survey showed that a relatively 
a. What we know how to do: This would be the technical 
heart of the capability. An example would be Statham's Thin Film Trans- 
ducer Technology. In this portion of the description I the general field 
is named. It would probably be followed by hardware proofs citing ex- 
amples of past applications of the products produced by the capability. 
b. How we control what we do: This information includes 
statements about management, company organization, systems know-how, quality 
assurance, documentation, and so on. 
important to getting and keeping business. 
All are nontechnical but all are 
For more on this approach and a description of the techniques employed 
see: \ Lawrence I). McGlauchlin, "Long Range Technical Planning," 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1968, pp, 54-64. 
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c. Resources we do it with: People, f a c i l i t i e s ,  equipment, 
and finances are general classes of resources called out i n  t h i s  par t  of the 
statement. 
technical and nontechnical aspects of capabili ty are constructed. 
' I  
They are the ultimate building blocks out of which both the 
The upshot i s  that there a re  a number of required market- 
and buyer-imposed factors t ha t  keep contractors from focusing upon t h e i r  
elemental o r  functional technical s k i l l s .  
7. Contractors concentrate on making their  capabi l i t ies  known 
t o  existing customers. 
d i f f i c u l t  and expensive. Companies naturally address t h e i r  e f fo r t s  i n  t h i s  
regard t o  existing customers where they already have t h e i r  foot i n  the door 
i n  order t o  maximize the return. 
customers and are  organized to parshal 
This i s  because t rue capabili ty expression i s  
Also, they know the  needs of  existing 
t h e i r  s k i l l s  t o  serve these needs. 
8. Contractors often fa i l  to see needs that ex i s t  outside of 
aerospace t o  which the i r  capabi l i t ies  could be addressed. The reason i s  
the concentration on existing customers. 
t o  problems outside the aerospace market usually a r i ses  because the person 
w i t h  the need stumbles across the company with the capability. 
essent ia l ly  the case i n  the two most dramatic t ransfer  instances found i n  
the surveys. 
Thus, application of capabi l i t ies  
This was 
Statham's move in to  medical instrumentation was i n i t i a t e d  by 
medical researchers with a problem. The medical researchers were located 
a t  Wright Field and Statham had a n  operation there. A s  a resu l t  of t h i s  
proximity, the doctors learned of Statham's capabili ty and asked tha t  it 
be applied t o  t h e i r  problem. 
core planes for  IBM began i n  much the same way. IBM moved in to  Boulder, 
Colorado, and sought l oca l  sub-contractors. B a l l  Brothers made the i r  basic 
capabi l i t ies  known to them, but it was IBM which in i t i a t ed  negotiations 
fo r  the specific memory-core plane work. 
B a l l  Brothers' manufacture of computer memory- 
9. Contractors probably f a i l  t o  see or  exploit  opportunities 
f o r  subordinate capabili ty components i n  non-aerospace applications. Since 
contractors view t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  an organismic and a mission-directed 
manner, they a re  not l i ke ly  t o  perceive opportunities t o  apply isolated 
skills, and a re  less l ike ly  t o  actively seek 0u.t new applications f o r  such 
skills. Further, since the component elements of capabi l i t ies  are only of 
periphqral importance t o  company goal achievement, the firm i s  not l ike ly  
t o  act ively enter  a new area even i f  an opportunity i s  identified.  
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10. The nature of a contractor's business operations conditions 
h is  def ini t ion of capability. NASA's contractors and the i r  subcontractors 
are not a homogeneous group. 
f i r m .  
d i t ion  the statement of capability. 
There i s  no such thing as a typical  aerospace 
There are a t  l e a s t  three types of differences among firms which con- 
- Size: Generally speaking, smaller companies can formulate 
more expl ic i t  capabili ty statements than large companies can. 
b. Systems vs. components: Contractors primarily engaged i n  
systems management and systems engineering experience more d i f f i cu l ty  i n  de- 
fining t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  than do producers of components. 
t ha t  the systems company has fewer tangible benchmarks t o  employ as 
descriptors. 
The reason is  
Another aspect of t h i s  problem i s  tha t  many systems firms 
also do some component work. I n  fac t ,  they may do the same type of com- 
ponent work as a specialized component su3contractor. But the systems firm 
probably w i l l  not view h i s  component s k i l l s  as a significant capability. 
Obviously, the subcontractor w i l l  see h i s  component capabili ty as highly 
significant.  Th i s  character is t ic  i s  an impediment t o  complete disclosure 
of the universe of capabili t ies possessed by NASA's contractors. 
e. Research and services vs. production: Ident i f icat ion of 
capabi l i t ies  possessed by contractors primarily engaged i n  e i ther  of these 
ac t iv i ty  areas encountered problems similar t o  those i n  the system vs. com- 
ponents case. Capabilities i n  research are i n  an en t i re ly  different c lass  
than those i n  production. Also, the languages used i n  the two areas of en- 
deavor are  markedly different .  As  a resu l t ,  a single,  uniform method of 
describing the capabi l i t ies  of a11 NASA contractors i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  foresee. 
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I V .  IMPLICA!I!IONS OF THF,SE FINDINGS FOR A SUCCESSFUL 
CAPfS6ILITIES C E m R  
The project findings contain highly significant implications fo r  
( a )  the des i rab i l i ty  of a Capabilities Center and (b )  the major chaxacter- 
i s t i c s  and constraints t ha t  define a successfil  Center operation. I n  fac t ,  
when an analysis of the opinions gathered i n  the Phase I1 study was added 
t o  the interim findings of the p i lo t  study, it became clear tha t  the or igi-  
n a l  concept of a multi-purpose, broadly inclusive nation-wide reg is t ry  of 
contractor s k i l l s  needed t o  be dras t ica l ly  revised. 
Therefore, a major concern during the Phase I1 studies was 
t o  ascertain: 
perform; (b) the prac t ica l i ty  and cost of acquiring and processing the 
necessary data; and (c) the-  usefulness of the system outputs t o  various 
potential  groups of users. 
(a) what functions a Capabilities Center could and should 
The i n i t i a l  concept of a Contractors Capabilities Center, as  de- 
veloped i n  conversations w i t h  NASA, and as described i n  the work statement 
and proposal f o r  t h i s  project,  envisioned a broad gage, multi-purpose, 
multiple-user information system. Specifically, t h i s  project was designed 
t o  explore the f e a s i b i l i t y  and des i rab i l i ty  of a national Capabilities 
Center which : 
* Would catalog and provide reference services fo r  specif ic  
technical capabili t ies found among NASA contractors and 
the i r  sub-contractors. 
* Would provide d i rec t  benefits  t o  NASA's procurement ac t iv i t i e s .  
* Would a id  i n  the growth and broader u t i l i za t ion  of special  
capabi l i t ies  developed for ,  or induced by, the space program. 
* Could accelerate the solution of many exis t ing problems i n  
diverse f ie lds .  
* Could lead t o  an even more comprehensive indexing and referral 
system which would include capabili ty inputs from DOD, AEC, 
SBA, Commerce, and others. 
* Could provide ready access t o  capabi l i t ies  appropriate t o  
problem requirements of a l l  government agencies and qualified 
private organizations. 
* Would retr ieve information required t o  conduct studies aimed 
at  assessing the economic impact of the space program. 
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Some questions were le f t  open: 
contractors should have access t o  Capabilities'Center information, how they 
might wish t o  use such a system, and whether contractor requirements would 
represent a significant portion of the t o t a l  ac t iv i ty  i n  the proposed 
Capabilities Center. 
with the proposed center was gathered i n  the p i lo t  study, and the views of 
NASA procurement offices,  Technology Utilization, and program offices were 
e l i c i t ed  and analyzed as par t  of the Phase I1 studies. 
for  example, whether prime and sub- 
Information bearing on the relations of contractors 
A. Information Compatibility 
The most important implication of the study findings affecting 
the design and development of a Capabilities Center re la tes  to the compati- 
b i l i t y  within a single system t o  support both marketing functions and non- 
marke t ing applications . 
Analysis of the capability information used i n  the marketing, 
procurement, contracting, and sub-contracting processes shows tha t  the 
content and form of the capabili ty information i s  significantly different 
from capabili ty information organized fo r  purposes other than buying and 
sel l ing.  
contractors and potential  users of the Capabilities Center suggest tha t  
the two kinds of capabili t ies information are not compatible, and should 
not be combined i n  the same operational system. 
In  addition, the vigorously expressed consenses of both NASA 
Chart 1 presents an array of the principal groups of users or 
potent ia l  customers for  the proposed Capabilities Center, together with 
the main ways i n  which they can use or provide the infomation handled 
i n  the system. I n  discussions and correspondence w i t h  the various using 
groups throughout t h i s  research study, it w a s  repeatedly made clear that  
capabili t ies information and capabili t ies statements can be and are used 
for  many different  purposes. Furthermore, the information requirements of 
a particular using organization are not unique or  peculiar to tha t  group, 
but rather depend upon two related aspects of the intent of the user: (a) 
the particular purpose for  which the capability information w i l l  be used, 
and (b) the implied role of the user when he seeks information about capa- 
b i l i t i es .  
capabili ty information i n  three different roles : 
For example, a NASA p r k e  contractor deals with and processes 
1. A s  a se l l e r  of capabili t ies (both h is  own and those of other 
organizations) ; 
2. A s  a buyer evaluating the capabili t ies of suppliers and sub- 
contractors; and 
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CHART 1 
PRINCIPAL USER GROUPS AND USES FOR CAPABILITY INFORMATION 
Protective 
Constructive 
Using Group 
NASA - Technology Uti l izat ion 
- . - - - . .- 
NASA - Procurement Offices 
. . . __ 
NASA - Program Offices 
Building qual i f ied bidders' l i s t  
Avoiding cr i t i c i sm of procurement pract ices  
Controlling costs  
Insuring adequate competition 
- 
PRIME CONTMCMRS 
Performer 
S e l l e r  
SUBCONTRACTORS 
Maintaining inventory of in-house s k i l l s  and experience 
Making own capabi l i t i es  a t t r a c t i v e  t o  the prime contractor 
- _. 
. . _. 
(DOD, AEC, e tc . )  
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
(OSTS, SBA, e tc . )  
Use t o  Be Made of Capability Information I Role -
Internal  Monitoring of technological s k i l l s  
and special  s tudies  
- --. 
External Matching of avai lable  technology t o  problems 
Identifying areas of benefi t ,  impact, j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
----- 
Discovering unknown ta len t  
Conservative Sol ic i t ing  best  q u d i f i e d  sources t o  perform jobs which 
(Managerial) a r e  planned and budgeted 
Explorative Uncovering new ideas which may expand and enhance missions 
Se l le r  
Buyer 
Making own capabi l i t i es  look outstanding but not 
Strengthening proposal by using subcontractors having 
so specialized as t o  shut them out 
reputation, v i s i b i l i t y ,  and good ideas 
I__ 
Selecting qual i f ied,  t ractable ,  dependable, and low-cost 
subcontractors and vendors 
Performer Locating possible f ixes  for troubles 
Selecting vendors 
I - 
references 
ideas served by agency 
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3. As  a contract performer occasionally faced with the necessity 
of finding al ternat ive ways t o  sa t i s fy  technical require- 
ments (e i ther  by using other techniques in-house or by 
employing the s k i l l s  of other groups) .g 
As shown i n  Chart 1, a wide range of uses i s  currently made of 
capabili ty information. We believe tha t  similar capabili ty inputs and 
outputs would be expected of a broad-gage , general-purpose centralized f i l e  
of contractor capabi l i t ies .  
It i s  important, therefore, t o  understand how the purpose behind 
asking fo r  or furnishing capabili ty information determines the content and 
form of capabili ty information. 
The most important single finding of the study i s  that  capabil- 
i t i e s  are almost universally viewed as an in t r in s i c  part  of the marketing 
process. 
Specifically,  the view tha t  capabili t ies are an essent ia l  par t  
of the buying-selling process largely determines haw any particular capa- 
b i l i t y  or s k i l l  w i l l  be identified,  named, c lass i f ied,  documented, verified,  
displayed or communicated, evaluated and interpreted by the recipient , and 
eventually acted upon. The majority of conclusions i n  the Phase I report 
underscore th i s  point i n  various ways. The substance and form i n  which a 
capabili ty i s  described by contractors accurately mirrors various levels 
of the marketing process. Capabilities are described i n  certain ways 
because these statements are intended t o  perform defini te  functions i n  
sel l ing the technical capabi l i t ies  of the organization. Contractors name 
and classify the i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  forms that  r e f l ec t  what t he i r  customers 
seek from them. 
order of importance t o  marketing success. 
And capabi l i t ies  are  usually expressed i n  anticipated 
Primarily t o  assess the degree of compatibility of capabi l i t ies  
data, a more detailed analysis w a s  made of the relationship between (a) the 
purposes f o r  which capabi l i t ies  information i s  expressed 
and content of t ha t  expression. 
and (b)  the form 
Thepurposesof use have been divided into three categories: uses 
s t r i c t l y  i n  marketing and procurement, uses where procurement i s  a secondary 
but ultimate objective, and uses not concerned w i t h  se l l ing or buying. 
It has a l so  been suggested from time t o  time tha t  NASA contractors make 
use of capabili ty information for  the purpose of assessing the i r  
technological position i n  re la t ion  t o  other organizations, and fo r  
evaluating the attractiveness of investment i n  the f’urther development 
of a new capabili ty for  eventual marketing as a specialty of the f i r m .  
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1. Capabilities used exclusively i n  marketing and procurement 
. Building and maintaining a l i s t  of qualified bidders. 
. Selecting vendors (by contractors). 
Sol ic i t ing bids from best-qualified SOurceS. 
. Broadening bidders' l i s t  by adding another agency's sources. 
. Presenting capabi l i t ies  i n  proposal or  bid.  
Strengthenire proposal by c i t ing  outstanding capabi l i t ies  
of sub-contractors . 
. Selecting most desirable sub-contractor. 
. Safeguarding procurement process from crit icism. 
For these purposes, statements of capabi l i t ies  are a direct  medium 
of communication between se l l e r  and buyer, and use a formal, highly s tyl ized 
almost r i t u a l i s t i c  language implying capabili ty at  the same time tha t  it 
avoids specific description. Several simultaneous messages of communication 
are intended--the image and reputation of the se l l e r ,  h i s  market orientation, 
the general technical area of the capability, plus resources suff ic ient  t o  
insure sat isfactory performance. 
Expressions of capabili ty are basical ly  a metaphor that  conveys 
information suff ic ient  for  i t s  audience to evaluate the producer's capabil- 
i t y  without enumerating the elements and s k i l l s  which are involved. 
Examples : 
Controls 
Aerospace transducers 
Complete capabili ty from analysis through experimental production 
Anti- submarine warfare 
Solar pointing 
Organization f o r  effect ive systems management 
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Gust a l leviat ion 
Contract cost control program 
On-board tape recorders 
Navigation, guidance, and control 
Station keeping 
Gemini communication lasers  
Reducing t o  numbers the complex factors associated with systems 
e f f e c t  ivene s s 
Integrated biomedical electronics 
Sa te l l i t e  nuclear power systems 
Replica optics 
Gravity gradient s tabi l izat ion 
Ablative heat shields 
Acoustic surveillance and detection 
Mars microbiological experiments 
Electr ic  space propulsion 
Configuration change control 
During Phase I1 of th i s  study we confirmed our hypothesis tha t  
the NASA procurement offices viewpoint i s  remarkably similar t o  tha t  of 
contractors who are asked t o  name t h e i r  capabi l i t ies .  
are nearly identical .  The rubric i s  the same. For instance, the following 
capabili t ies are called out i n  one NASA capabili t ies c lass i f icat ion which-- 
according t o  the contractors interviewed--represents the best  organized and 
most r e a l i s t i c  procurement l i s t i ng :  
The words and tone 
S te l l a r  and planetary atmospheres 
Organization coordination 
Airborne nuclear power plants 
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Cost  -effect  ivene s s methods 
Bet at  r ons 
Anti- jam communications 
Management of quali ty control 
Ramjet engines and afterburners 
Frequency interference control 
Energy management 
Escape, rescue, and survival 
Planetary entry analysis 
Performance standards 
Rocket and missile vulnerabili ty 
Command and control equipment 
2. Procurement as secondary, but ultimate objective 
. Discovering unknown t a l en t .  
. Uncovering new ideas and approaches t o  expand or enhance 
missions. 
. Locating possible f ixes  for  production troubles. 
. Assessing awn position f o r  make-or-buy decision. 
. Identifying sources of rare ,  unique s k i l l s .  
. Describing capabili t ies speculatively, without respect t o  
a particular market or application. 
The common factor i n  each of these uses i s  tha t  an information 
problem of some complexity and sophistication must f i rs t  be solved before 
any procurement decisions can be s tar ted.  
Location of a r u e  or  highly specialized a b i l i t y  is  especially 
d i f f i cu l t  when the concepts m e  loosely defined or when nomenclature i s  
new and uncertain. 
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Searching fo r  skil ls  and ideas which can support a mission i n  
new and novel ways i s  closely akin t o  the problem of application matching 
i n  technology t ransfer .  
"speculatively," without knowledge of how it can be used i n  specific appli- 
cations or  markets--is equally d i f f i c u l t .  
The reverse probfem--describing capabili ty 
Thus, these uses typical ly  require a high degree of differentia- 
- t i o n  a t  the conceptual o r  functional level,  yet without much spec i f ic i ty  
regarding how the job i s  done. Compound adjectives and modifiers are used 
t o  suggest haw the a b i l i t y  d i f fe rs  from the ordinary, garden-variety capa- 
b i l i t y  of the same name. 
This c lass  of capabili ty statement r e f l ec t s  the uncertainty of 
buyer or s e l l e r  as t o  the exact pigeon-hole by which the a b i l i t y  can be 
categorized, or named, o r  recognized. Analogy or precedent i s  often 
employed. Qualification or evaluation of the capabili ty i s  a frequent 
component . 
Examples : 
Computerized 9th order fa i lure  mode and ef fec ts  analysis 
Solid s t a t e  amplifiers capable of operating a t  l iqu id  hydrogen 
temperature 
Ultra-high strength weldable alloys 
Highly r e a l i s t i c  mission analysis 
Marked r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement over current state-of -the-art 
Thirty megabit d i g i t a l  color TV system 
Signal conditioning electronics fo r  remote aerospace and 
telemetry measurement 
Fabricated or iginal  H-bomb cases 
Newest concepts i n  sol id  s t a t e  transduction technique 
F i r s t  contact ion-engine capable of useful thrust  
Knowledge of evaluation factors  i n  selecting alloys for thin- 
she l l  pressure vessel applications under prac t ica l  fabrication 
conditions 
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Peculiar c i rcu i t s  
Unfolding s a t e l l i t e  booms and locking knuckles 
Horizon sensors 
Precise passive temperature control 
Uniqiie s t r a in  gage al loy 
Electroforming plant i s  the most advanced i n  the country 
Unique Magnetotropometer f a c i l i t y  
Ultrasensitive sonic inspection f a c i l i t y  
3-dimensional display and character recognition variable 
parameter television t e s t  s e t  
3. Uses of capability information not concerned with buying o r  
se l l ing  
. Maintaining in-house s k i l l s  inventory. 
. Monitoring of technological capabili t ies (by NASA). 
. Supporting TU documentation and special  studies. 
. Matching available technology t o  problems. 
. Identifying areas of benefit ,  impact, just i f icat ion.  
. Searching for  technical ideas potentially useful. t o  
groups served by other government agencies. 
Since these purposes a l l  l i e  outside the d i rec t  buying-selling 
process, some d i f f i cu l t i e s  w i l l  be encountered i n  trying t o  use capabili ty 
statements (which - are market oriented) for  non-procurement ends. 
problem-solving focus of non-procurement capabili ty ident i f icat ion requires 
a reference description that includes specific sub-elements, organized by 
function performed, i n  addition t o  the name of the end item. 
The 
When capabi l i t ies  are described fo r  non-marketing purposes, there 
processes, components, 
This kind of emphasis i s  especially evident 
i s  a strong tendency t o  focus on specific elements: 
and/or supporting disciplines.  
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i n  any attempt t o  describe a capabili ty i n  terms of personnel having mastery 
i n  highly specialized disciplines,  a description which implies a capability 
t o  solve problems i n  these f i e lds .  
These capabili t ies attempt t o  answer the query: "What can we do?" 
The format suggests - HOW the solution w i l l  be achieved, rather than w h a t  will 
be delivered. 
Examples : 
Vacuum deposition of alloys without fractionation 
Slotted a i r f o i l  boundary layer control 
Diffusion bonding of honeycorrib structures 
Electrostat ic  image,passive intrusion surveillance 
Protective coatings fo r  refractory metals 
Quantum physics 
Prediction of s t ress  fa i lure  under biaxial s t r a in  
Thermionic generator using solar concentrator 
Replication process fo r  mass producing quality optics using 
electrofor&ng and p l a s t i c  adhesive techniques 
Accelerated thermal aging and s tabi l izat ion of metal diaphragms 
Transfer of energy within l iving ce l l s  
Welding leads onto vacuum deposited c i rcu i t  elements without 
penetration t o  metal substrate 
Quantification of human t ransfer  functions 
Character generation and display techniques 
Large vacuum brazing f'urnaces 
Contamination free,  laminar f l a w  opt ical  assembly f a c i l i t y  
Techniques fo r  adherent precious m e t a l  plating 
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Fi'ber quartz drawing 
Automatic, third-order lens design 
Methodology t o  analyze requirements i n  detail and with structure 
using complete hierarchical se t s  
Substrate finishing t o  opt ical  surface quali ty 
The chief differences i n  the ways capabili t ies are  described fo r  
these three types of end uses are summarized i n  abbreviated form i n  Chart 2. 
The differences i n  format and language do not necessarily render 
the information incompatible with procurement capabili t ies.  From the stand- 
point of information technology there i s  no reasonwhy capabili t ies informa- 
t ion  of a l l  three types could: not be accommodated i n  the sane f i l e .  But 
it must be understood tha t  the terminology control document would have t o  
be Larger and more complex. The f i l e  structure or index would be increased 
perhaps 50 percent, and would require copious cross-referrals. Thus,the 
cost of designin4 a capabi l i t ies  f i l e  to use a l l  three kinds of information 
would be significantly increased. 
The cost to NASA of acquiring comprehensive information on con- 
t rac tor  capabili t ies would be re la t ive ly  modest. The cost of processing 
and coding the f i l e  inputs would be appreciable. But the cost t o  the 
contractors who are required t o  furnish complete capabili ty information 
may be prohibitive. Five out of the 11 organizations interviewed stated 
that the cost of provid;ing such data was  out of a l l  proportion t o  the 
benefits  .g .  
Serious design problems are encountered when we seek t o  devise 
e f f ic ien t  file-searching s t ra tegies  t o  serve two main types of inquiries.  
One fi le-search matches demonstrated capabilities-in-being which are named 
chiefly for  procurement purposes. The second type of fi le-search requires 
associative matching of ideas o r  problems with potentially relevant s k i l l s .  
Several information-coding techniques are capable of e f f ic ien t ly  
performing the first ty-pe of procurement search. However, comments furnished 
by NASA Procurement people during Phase IS indicated quite c lear ly  tha t  t h i s  
ty-pe of searching i s  presently performed adequately by using existing f i l e s  
and methods, and that a central  system t o  do t h i s  type of matching i s  not 
needed badly enough t o  jus t i fy  the e f for t .  
1' Studies by Edward Roberts echo t h i s  view-- These systems cause pain t o  
those who must f'urnish the input data--you can discover th i s  from a 
discussion with any government R&;D contractor.'' 
August 1968, p. 43. 
Science and Technology, 
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CHART 2 
FORM AND CONTENT OF W'ILITIES 
OBJECTIVE 
Procurement Only Procurement Secondary Non- Pro CUT ement 
How Capabilities Are: 
Increasing Mx * ssion Increasing Problem 
Orientation Solving Orientation 
Identified Broadly--as total ability to 
satisfy. With reference to 
a market. As composites, not 
elements. To include manage- 
ment and other non-technical 
resources 
Semi-specific. As 
sub-systems or elements, 
sometimes with reference 
a market, sometimes not. 
Specific elements. 
As process, service 
to or product. 
Named As what the customer asks for. 
As deliverable end item. 
Using adjectives, modifiers, 
and qualifiers or either 
end item or element. As technique. 
As technical discipline. 
As product. 
Classified By markets served. 
By product class. 
By function performed. 
Also by markets. 
By function performed. 
Differentiated By contribution to customer 
satisfaction. 
By HOW it differs, and by 
DEGREE of difference. 
By advantages gained. 
Documented 
Verified 
By performance characteristic. By specifications. In customer language. 
By analogy and 
precedent. 
By test results. By precedent of successful 
application. 
Naming satisfied customers. 
Communicated At vendor's initiative; or 
when requested, in order of 
importance to marketing. 
Speculatiyely, when 
angling for unknown mar- 
ket. On request from 
customer. 
In response to inquiry. 
Interpreted Subjectively--as metaphor, 
As credentials of qualifi- 
cation to do related but 
possibly different job. 
Subjectively--as potential Objectively--as ability 
to furnish a critical sub- to achieve a novel 
element. solution to a problem. 
Acted Upon Informal negotiation to 
explore abilities. Information furnished 
Leading eventually to 
formal procurement action. 
No procurement act ion. 
may be end sought. 
Formal decision regard- 
ing advance to next stage 
of procure&nt. 
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On the other hand, none of the general inquirer methods which have 
been developed provides a straightforward solution t o  the matching and 
r e t r i eva l  of problem statements and relevant capabi l i t ies .  
I n  designing a capabi l i t ies  f i l e  t o  perform searching of t h i s  
more d i f f i c u l t  type, one w i l l  want a system that  can use computerized aids 
t o  human judgments of applicabili ty,  relevance, and appropriateness. The 
use of U.D.C. or other facet  codes i n  conjunction with associative nets 
or relevance t rees  would go a long way toward providing a reactive too l  t o  
a id  the matching of problem statements and potentially useful s k i l l s .  
Some progress toward associative matching has already been achieved 
i n  the p i lo t  designs of procurement selection programs such as TORQVE (Tech- 
nology or  Research Quantitative Ut i l i t y  Evaluation) . 
relevance and appl icabi l i ty  factors which serve t o  re la te  the degree of 
support or association between capabi l i t ies  and mission technological re- 
quirements. Although much different  associative links would be needed for  
a NASA capabi l i t ies  f i l e ,  some of the sitme concepts are applicable. The 
development of relevance networks, or  arrowgraphs similar t o  those used 
by Euratom offer  other approaches. 
This scheme involves 
Any such system should be designed s o  tha t  the inquirer can 
interact  w i t h  the machineable f i l e  and adjust the search strategy, so as 
t o  be able t o  re-format his  query i n  a dialogue tha t  w i l l  f lush out capa- 
b i l i t i e s  t ha t  would otherwise not have been adjudged as pertinent.  After 
identifying a "shopping l i s t "  of tentat ively relevant approaches fo r  the 
inquirer, the computer s y s t q  has finished i t s  job. A t  t h i s  stage human 
judgment needs t o  be applied, and more detailed information i s  required 
than can readlily be kept i n  ,machine-manipulatable form. Good old-fashioned 
reading, understanding, and creative imagination are needed now. But the 
effectiveness of a TU t ransfer  agent could be tremendously augmented by a 
powerful reactive capabi l i t ies  f i l e .  
B .  Unique and Rare Capabilities 
Many of the problems 
prehensive and general purpose 
overcome by shif t ing the focus 
capabi l i t ies .  
I n  ten  out of eleven 
implicit  i n  devising and maintaining a com- 
f i l e  of contractor capabi l i t ies  can be 
t o  the scarce, new, dis t inct ive or unique 
firms interviewed, management was able t o  
identif'y a few capabi l i t ies  which they considered outstanding or unique. 
It seems much easie; t o  answer questions such as--"What can you do that no 
one e l se  i s  able t o  do?" or "Have you learned t o  do something be t te r  than 
any other firm?"--than it i s  t o  ident i fy  a l l  potent ia l ly  relevant 
capabi l i t ies  . 
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I n  addition t o  ease of identification, we found tha t  unique 
capabi l i t ies  tend t o  be named and described i n  a more technical view, and 
with a problem solving orientation. These characterist ics are associated 
with the description of capabi l i t ies  for  purposes somewhat removed from 
the procurement s i tuat ion (toward the r igh t  side of Chart 2). 
The reason, we believe, i s  tha t  newly born a b i l i t i e s  have not 
yet become se t  i n  the mold of a corporate capabili ty ( i . e  . , "What our 
customers ask us for");  the contractors s t i l l  tend t o  regard these accom- 
plishments as "components" of some future marketable capability. 
The functions performed and the means of accomplishment receive 
more at tent ion than does the market served. 
the capabili ty being new; managers may not yet know many of the ultimate 
applications that  could be developed. 
This emphasis may resu l t  from 
The very nature of highly dis t inct ive capabi l i t ies  offers one 
simple means fo r  validating the capabili ty as described: ask who e lse  
possesses comparable or  nearly equal ab i l i t y .  Two firms suggested this  
straightforward way of checking. 
front of new technology can usually name the i r  closest competitors i n  some 
specialized area of  s k i l l  or accomplishment. If two groups do not recognize 
each other as technical front-runners, it probably means that  the capabili ty 
of one is so new tha t  knowledge of it has not spread, o r  t ha t  there may be 
reason t o  question the va l id i ty  of one s ta ted capabili ty.  
They indicated tha t  f i r m s  a t  the fore- 
Newly developed capabi l i t ies  which have been demonstrated t o  be 
unusually successful occupy a peculiar position w i t h  regard t o  contractor 
willingness t o  disclose information about the a b i l i t y .  I n  the speculative 
stage when the contractor i s  not sure how f a r  the application of the capa- 
b i l i t y  can be carried,  or in to  what markets, management was  re la t ive ly  
open and eager t o  discuss t h e i r  capabili ty.  After a corporate decision 
has been reached t o  pursues further development and apply the capabili ty t o  
some defined market, the cloak of secrecy i s  l i ke ly  t o  decend. I B M  offers 
a s t r iking example of t h i s  behavior applied curiously enough, not t o  a 
product or  a technical process, but t o  a re la t ive ly  "soft" capability--the 
methodology fo r  detailed technical mission analysis and economic jus t i f ica-  
t ion .  Management believes t h i s  capabili ty t o  be so valuable tha t  the group 
which has received awards and national recognition for i t s  accomplishment, 
i s  severely limited i n  discussing the new and outstanding capability. . 
I n  most cases, however, contractors are completely w i l l i n g  t o  make 
known the i r  unique capabi l i t ies .  
often lead 
Vi s ib i l i t y  and understanding by others 
t o  new and profitable applications. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY-UTILIZATION PROGRAMS 
A.  Contractor Views of Capability Provide Insights Into Technology 
Util ization 
Although t h i s  research program was  specif ical ly  targeted a t  the 
f eas ib i l i t y  of a contractor Capabilities Center, o w  investigations dis- 
closed a number of features associated with capabili t ies--their  development , 
application, marketing, and acceptance--that have implications fo r  a broad 
range of technology-utilization questions. The f ac t  tha t  a study of techni- 
ca l  capabili t ies would bring t o  l igh t  findings relat ing t o  technology 
u t i l i za t ion  should not have been unexpected. NASA's contractors are i n  the 
business of developing, adapting, accepting, and u t i l i z ing  new technologies. 
The procedures they have adopted i n  the conduct of t he i r  business; t h e i r  
views of t he i r  capabili t ies;  t he i r  behavior w i t h  respect t o  capabili ty de- 
velopment, application, and marketing; the constraints which ac t  upon t h i s  
process; plus other related matters--all have relevance for  technology 
u t i l i za t ion .  
An examination of typical  characterist ics of the capabili ty de- 
velopment and application process discloses features tha t  have positive 
effects  on technology diffusion and features tha t  impede such diffusion. 
Explicit  recognition of these factors i n  the design and operation of tech- 
nology u t i l i za t ion  programs w i l l  provide greater leverage per unit of 
e f for t  than might otherwise be obtained. 
The specific insights arid implications called out i n  the following 
discussion were developed from our interviews, and are generally supported 
by the l i t e r a tu re  on the subject. 
B .  Insights Can Be Used t o  Enhance Existing Technology Util ization Programs 
and t o  Design New Approaches 
1. Problem o r  Application Identification: O u r  analysis indicates 
that  the greatest  technology-utilization leverage can be obtained by the 
ident i f icat ion of non-space problems t o  which capabili t ies or space de- 
veloped technologies can be addressed. Just about every character is t ic  
associated with the capabili ty formation and buying process supports t h i s  
view. 
Proposal or even a broad mission statement like--"Placethree men i n  space 
f o r  t en  days, support them, and recover them"--contractors do an excellent 
job of assessing the technical requirements, forming the necessary capabili ty 
from t h e i r  pool of resources, and then organizing and managing the capabili ty 
t o  achieve the s ta ted objective. 
Given a NASA problem statement i n  the form of a specific Request fo r  
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Our findings indicate tha t  a capabili ty w i l l  not be formed u n t i l  
the need fo r  it is  perceived by the contractor possessing the requis i te  
s k i l l s ,  And, a capabili ty cannot be applied u n t i l  it has a buyer. The 
potent ia l  buyer must recognize tha t  he has a need, and tha t  a capabili ty 
can be applied t o  satisfy the need. On the other hand, the s e l l e r  must 
a l so  recognize the need, and recognize tha t  he has or can form an appro- 
pr ia te  capabili ty.  
A s  a buyer of technologies, NASA has exploited these characteris- 
t i c s  of  the capability-application process. NASA has analyzed i t s  space 
missions to determine the i r  technical requirements and then widely dissemin- 
ated these needs to potent ia l  contractors, who i n  t u r n  respond by forming 
the necessary capabi l i t ies ,  which they apply upon contract award. 
This same general approach has great u t i l i t y  i n  promoting the 
F i r s t ,  
application of NASA-induced technology to non-space applications. I n  fac t ,  
the  Biomedical Applications Teams already ]follow t h i s  approach. 
medical problems are identified.  Then, routes to solutions are  sought from 
the body of NASA-developed technology. The EAT concept a lso provides for  
adaptation of the technologies t o  the new medical use. Extension of t h i s  
approach to ( o r  intensif icat ion of existing a c t i v i t i e s  i n )  other pressing 
problem areas (e.g., a i r  and water pollution, 
urban reconstruction , e tc  . ) holds high promise. 
e control, transportation, 
2, Incentive: Although problem ident i f icat ion i s  a necessary 
precondition for capabili ty formation, the c r i t i c a l  event tha t  m u s t  take 
place before capabili ty application i s  the provision of incentive t o  do so. 
Incentive can take many forms. Important among these a re  sc i en t i f i c  
curiosity,  engineering tenacity when confronted with an unsolved problem, 
and money. The f i r s t  two forms of incentive are very important, b u t  the 
supply i s  re la t ively fixed i n  the /short  run by the number of people avail-  
able with these motivations. There i s  l i t t l e  t ha t  the Office of Technology 
Uti l izat ion can do d i rec t ly  to enlarge the number of these people available. 
Bu t  NASA can exploit the money incentive--more properly, NASA can! indicate 
the market potent ia l  available from the solution of ident i f ied non-space 
problems. Given a defined need and a n  associated a t t r ac t ive  market, aero- 
space resources (technologies) do get  applied /to non-space problems. This 
occurs i n  much the same way and for  the same reasons that these resources 
were ea r l i e r  applied to NASA problems. 
Several such e f fo r t s  of t h i s  tyye are now under way. For example, one 
involves the cooperative e f fo r t s  of NASA (Office of Technology U t i l i -  
zation) , Department of In t e r io r  ( Federal Water \Pollution Control Ad- 
min . on) , and MpI ( Biomedical" A-&J.i..-t&ns Team) :- 
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A t  l ea s t  two of the firms we interviewed made significant moves 
into non-space markets. 
capabili t ies developed t o  meet NASA/DOD demands. 
despite the fac t  t ha t  both firms saw themselves as almost exclusively space 
and defense contractors. They responded t o  the new marhts when the non- 
space opportunities were communicated t o  them i n  the form of technical 
requirements or  needs, and when the market potential  was demonstrated t o  be 
worth the bother. Because the firms were focused on the i r  existing customers, 
the impetus for  the transfers came from the non-aerospace buyer i n  both cases, 
and the i n i t i a l  encounters were almost accidental. The experience of these 
two firms does offer  proof that  aerospace firms can and w i l l  adapt t he i r  capa- 
b i l i t i e s  ( t ransfer  technology) when presented with an a t t rac t ive  opportunity.l/ 
Obviously, not every f i r m  w i l l  be able t o  adapt i t s  capabili t ies t o  sa t i s fy  
every non-space need, but i f  NASA were t o  make available information on non- 
space needs t o  aerospace firms (and others) i n  a systematic and formal way, 
the environment for  technology t ransfer  would be enhanced. Given non-space 
market need and market potential  information, ra t ional  business behavior on 
the par t  of contractors should--at a minimum--make t ransfer  opportunity 
assessment a routine rather than exceptional experience. 
These moves were made using modifications of 
Technology was transferred, 
3. Technology Possessor/Technology User Rapport: Effective capa- 
b i l i t y  expression and communication require a high degree of famil iar i ty  
and interaction between buyer and se l l e r .  A l l  contractors interviewed be- 
lieved t hat "t e chnical ink imacy" - -but not ne ce s sari y personal intimacy- -is 
required i f  they are t o  market t he i r  capabi1 i t ies .d  To s a t i s fy  t h i s  re- 
quirement contractors focus the i r  marketing e f for t s  on existing customers 
t o  the potential  exclusion of other capability-application opportunities. 
Indeed, the way contractors view t h e i r  capabili t ies i s  a direct  outgrowth 
of the needs of existing customers. 
addressed t o  the needs of new customers are ra re ly  recognized by contractors. 
Latent capabili t ies tha t  might be 
r/ "The key step, especially for  an innovation that spins off t o  non-mili- 
No matter how powerful the other factors, 
tary,  non-NAXA sectors of the economy, i s  industry's realization of 
the opportunity potential ,  
if industry does not see any benefits over and beyond the government 
applications, the innovation will see limited use and a narrow market." 
Herbert S. Xleiman, "A Case Study of Innovation," Business Horizons 
(Winter ,  1966) pp. 63-70. 
For more on this  point see: 
Management," Science and Technology, No. 80, (August 1968) ,=pp. 40-46. 
Edward B. Roberts, "The Myths of Research 
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The implication for TU from this is that the inducement of con- 
tractors to apply their skills in non-space fields requires not only infor- 
mation about market identification and market magnitude, but also potential 
non-space customer identification and contact. 
steps to lower the non-space customer identification and buyer-seller famil- 
iarity barriers. 
some particular non-space problem (some aspect of the air pollution control 
problem, for example) at which representatives of aerospace firms would 
discuss with potential buyers--government and private--the problem and so- 
lution approaches. 
limited to encouraging such experiments, it could include conference format 
suggestions, or it might include joint sponsorship with relevant mission 
agencies or private associations. In any event, such encounters would also 
do much to reduce the barriers to transfer posed by the different "languages" 
spoken in aerospace and other industries. Our findings and TU'S experience 
indicate that "language" is a significant impediment to transfer. 
NASA can take a number of 
One such step would be working conferences addressed to 
NASA's role could take several forms: it might be 
4. The Office of Technology Utilization Works with the Tip of 
the Capabilities Iceberg: 
interviewed in this study disclosed an impressive number of new, important, 
Even the small sampling of NASA contractors 
and useful capabilities concerned with new techniques, new products, new 
management concepts, manufacturing controls, materials know-how, and all 
the other factors which go to make up "space technology.'' Observation and 
comparison convinced the investigators that many of the capabilities en- 
countered were significantly advanced over counterpart skills and capabil- 
ities found in non-aerospace industry. But relatively few of these con- 
tractor capabilities are made known to the Office of Technology Utilization. 
There are several reasons why this is so, and these will be' discussed more 
fully. But first, the implications for NASA's technology utilization activ- 
ities should be discussed. NASA should give consideration to whether some 
presently unreported contractor-developed capabilities should be identified 
and documented for  TU and whether there are appropriate and effective ways 
to do so. 
be documented effectively, yet are still potentially transferable. Considera- 
tion should be given to TU actions that would stimulate transfer without 
going through the steps of documentation and reporting to NASA. 
In addition, it appears that some of these capabilities can never 
The reasons why capabilities are not reported have relevance for 
the design of new capture methods and transfer stimulation actions. Only a 
small fraction of the capabilities were developed solely in the performance 
of NASA contracts. More typically, capabilities come into being as a result 
of a combination of NASA, DOD, and company sponsorship. Since most capabil- 
ities are not directly traceable to NASA funding, they are not reported under 
the New Technology Reporting Clause. Perhaps more important, contractors 
just do not look at their capabilities in a way that would produce reportable 
"items," Instead, they see them as composites of talents and resources 
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required t o  deliver the product t o  the customer, Everything i s  viewed i n  
the context of the job at  hand. 
n ica l  solutions are  often overlooked because " tha t ' s  the way any good en- 
gineer would do it i f  he were working on this problem." Proprietary i n t e r -  
e s t s  a l so  l i m i t  reporting t o  NASA. It i s  our opinion that proprietary i n -  
t e r e s t s  
intent .  
with market promise. When th i s  s i tua t ion  occurs, a t ransfer  has occurred, 
even though it did not happen through formal Tu mechanisms and was not re- 
ported t o  RASA as a t ransfer  achieved. 
A s  a r e s u l t ,  new, novel, and unusualtech- 
rarely intervene i n  the reporting process as a resul t  of malicious 
Instead, it i s  a noma1 desire t o  exploit--on one's own--a discovery 
The f i n a l  reporting impediment stems from the f ac t  t h a t  many capa- 
b i l i t i e s  amount t o  nothing more than a par t icular  company's being fa r ther  
along the "learning curve" than anyone else.  
basically a body of experience with a high "ar t"  component and are  extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  document. 
group, bu t  they can be transferred (applied) t o  another problem by the group 
which developed and possesses the know-how. 
Capabilities of this  type are  
They are  almost impossible t o  t ransfer  t o  another 
5. The Cost of Information: The cost of obtaining i n f o m t i o n  
determines i n  par t  whether newly developed capabi l i t ies  w i l l  be exploited. 
The extent and r a t e  of t ransfer  of capabi l i t ies  t o  new uses or new markets 
likewise may be limited by the cost of information. 
Six of the companies interviewed had developed interest ing new 
technical capabi l i t ies ,  but had not yet been able t o  make a corporate de- 
termination whether they should pursue fur ther  exploitation of these a b i l i t i e s  
and attempt t o  f ind new markets and new applications f o r  the s k i l l s .  
ways could soon be found t o  turn capabi l i t ies  into prof i t s ,  it i s  likely 
tha t  the capabili ty would die.  
Unless 
Our findings indicate tha t  p ro f i t  potential .can and often does 
a t t r a c t  the application of capabi l i t ies  t o  new uses. 
possession of a potent ia l ly  profitable capabili ty w i l l  not insure tha t  
application or t ransfer  w i l l  be seriously considered unless the firm knows 
with some confidence tha t  t h i s  potent ia l  p rof i t  ex is t s ,  knows the technical 
requirements of the new application, knows whom t o  contact, and knows a 
number of other things relevant t o  capabili ty application t o  a new use i n  
a new market context. This requires information-a l o t  of informtion and 
several different  kinds of information. 
However, even the 
I n  the report of the Phase I study we concluded: 
* Contractors tend t o  ignore or f a i l  t o  exploit  capabi l i t ies  and 
capabili ty components which are  not important t o  the achieve- 
ment of company goals. 
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* Contractors often fa i l  t o  see needs which ex is t  outside of 
aerospace t o  which t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  could be addressed. 
* New capabi l i t ies  - are-transferred--applied t o  other needs, or 
sold t o  other markets. 
t ransfer  of technology are complex. Factors other than the 
purely rationalmaximizing of expected prof i t s  are  found to 
influence these management decisions. 
But the economic rules  governing 
Further study suggests tha t  these seeming anomalies may be resolved 
as ra t iona l  economic behavior when the cost of information needed t o  t ransfer  
new capabi l i t ies  i s  considered. I n  some cases the cost of acquiring informa- 
t i on  suff ic ient  t o  decide whether t o  develop and exploit a new ab i l i t y ,  i s  
simply more than the firm i s  prepared t o  pay. 
Within recent years several ideas have been added t o  the emerging 
"Theory of the Firm'' with regard t o  management decisions. 
agreement tha t  many non-pecuniary elements figure in to  and influence mana- 
ger ia l  decision-making with regard t o  product development, marketing and R&D 
investments .L/ 
One i s  the gradual 
A more important development i s  recognition that  the information 
required fo r  making of choices i s  not a f ree  good, b u t  has a cost of acqui- 
s i t ion  that  may not  be worth paying.d 
formation tha t  will allow making sounder decisions about whether t o  pursue 
a new capabili ty or t o  abandon it, it i s  not surprising that some of these 
important decisions a re  made on the basis of fragmentary information, per- 
sonal or corporate preferences; or as Johnson points out--"on the basis of 
information provided i n  persuasive capsule form by par t ies  interested i n  
influencing the outcome of decisions." 
I n  view of the cost of obtaining i n -  
The f ac t  that management decisions regarding the development and 
t ransfer  of new capabi l i t ies  a r e  made i n  t h i s  way is  generally regarded, i n  
the neo-classical t radi t ion of economic theory, as a ref lect ion of the ir- 
ra t iona l i ty  of man i n  the economic system. When the cost of acquiring s u f -  
f i c i en t  information t o  decide bet ter  whether t o  t ransfer  capabili ty or 
abandon it i s  considered, such rule-of-thumb practices begin t o  appear both 
rat ional  and economic. 
L/ See Dow and Cullison, "Oligopoly, Intergroup Conflict, and the Growth of 
the Firm," American Journal Economics and Sociology, V o l .  24, July 1965, 
pp, 273-290. Also see Boulding, The Present Position of Theory of the 
Firm , p. 4, and Penrose, Theory of the Growth of the Firm, p. U. 
For a brief bu t  excellent discussion of information costs and policy im- 
plications see: Harry G. Johnson, "Economics and Public Policy: I. 
Economic Approach t o  Social Questions ," The Public In te res t  , (Summer, 
1968), p. 76. 
The 
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Two important implications fo r  NASA's technology u t i l i za t ion  pro- 
grams are that--"The production and dis t r ibut ion of information relevant 
t o  consumption choices i s  a necessary par t  of the economic system, not 
merely a wasteful excessence of it,"L/; and that the natural  economizing 
process of the marketplace w i l l  insure that such information i s  accepted 
and acted on even thoughthe information i s  not complete or  exhaustive, and 
the form i s  far short of that required by c lass ica l  scholarship. 
This high cost of information about capabili ty application oppor- 
tun i t ies  explains--in part--why NASA contractors concentrate on aerospace 
markets t o  the v i r tua l  exclusion of other possible market applications of 
t he i r  capabi l i t ies .  
ing customers (NASA and DOD), on forming information packages about how 
the i r  capabi l i t ies  can meet these needs, and then on communicating this i n -  
formation t o  NASA and DOD. 
they can obtain from the limited resources tha t  they can devote t o  capabil- 
i t y  opportunity assessment. 
Contractors focus on learning about the needs of exis t -  
By so doing, contractors maximize the benefits 
_ -  
Turning now t o  technologytransfer (sel l ing a new capabili ty t o  a 
new customer i n  a new market or buying from a new supplier from a different  
industry), we f ind tha t  the cost of the information necessary t o  ju s t i fy  a 
t ransfer  attempt i s  a t  l ea s t  as high--probably higher--than the information 
costs of operating i n  knm market niches, and the foreseeable benefits  are  
lower. 
significant bar r ie r  t o  technology t ransfer .  More often than not individual 
f i r m s  simply refuse t o  undertake the required costs.  
many potent ia l  t ransfer  opportunities never even reach a point of decision. 
Thus, the cost of information about needs and requirements i s  a 
The r e su l t  i s  tha t  
If the TU Office were t o  supply more of the information required 
t o  reach decisions on non-space t ransfer  opportunities, then the costs of 
exploring other possible applications would be reduced and the potent ia l  
fo r  t ransfer  would be enhanced. 
information regarding the commercial (market) f eas ib i l i t y  of using some 
new technique or other advance i s  par t  and parcel of the capabili ty forma- 
t i o n  and application process. By analogy, the d e v e l o p n t  and dissemina- 
t i on  of information on non-space market needs and opportunities i s  a valid 
and crucial  Technology Uti l izat ion function. 
I n  this  context OUT findings indicate tha t  
NASA cannot and should not undertake uni la te ra l  development and 
dissemination of non-space need ( opportunity) information. 
e f for t s  with government agencies responsible f o r  specific need areas (water 
pollution and crime control, for  example) or  interested industry associations 
a re  necessary. Missionary a c t i v i t i e s  t o  stimulate such jo in t  e f fo r t s  are  a 
legitimate NASA function--acting alone. 
Cooperative 
I! Johnson 2. @. 
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Obviously, the TU Office cannot supply complete market information 
on a l l  non-space needs to a l l  firms, bu t  it could ( i n  cooperation with others) 
disseminate selected market information on selected non-space needs that have 
high technology solution requirements and whose solution would be clear ly  i n  
NASA's and the public in te res t .  
6. NASA Contractors as Transfer Agents: Much of the current TU 
dissemination program i s  based upon technical data reported to t he  Technology 
Util ization Office by organizations in te rna l  t o  NASAor by contractors under 
the New Technology Reporting Clause. This information i s  then disseminated 
to a broad audience of potent ia l  technology acceptors who, i n  t u r n ,  may apply 
the new technology toward the solution of  a non-space problem within the con- 
t ex t  of a conventional marketing framework. This process involves a t  l ea s t  
four major par t ies ,  i . e . ,  the contractor who or iginal ly  developed the tech- 
nology, BASA, the non-aerospace acceptor of the technology, and the ultimate 
non-aerospace buyer of the f r u i t s  of  the  new technology. In  addition, the 
process has a numberof stepswhich m u s t  be performed, important among which 
are: the perception tha t  the technology i s  worthy of reporting, the report- 
ing of the technology to NASA, the screening of the report by NASA, the d i s -  
semination by NASA, the acceptance of the technology by the recipient,  the  
adaptation of the technology t o  the new use, the marketing of the new tech- 
nology or i t s  f r u i t s ,  and f ina l ly ,  the decision to buy by the ultimate user. 
The t ransfer  of technology requires tha t  there be change. But, 
because change i s  resis ted,  the l e s s  change required the be t t e r .  If the 
number of par t ies  currently involved i n  the t ransfer  of technology can be 
reduced, then the poss ib i l i t i es  fo r  transfer should be enhanced. The same 
i s  true for  the number of steps involved i n  the t ransfer  process; i f  they 
can be reduced, t ransfer  potent ia l  should increase. Both the number of 
steps and the number of par t ies  involved can be reduced if  the Technology 
Util ization program i s  expanded t o  emphasize t ransfer  from the possessors 
of the technology (NASA contractors) d i rec t ly  to non-aerospace buyers. 
t h i s  amounts to i s  a program to induce NASA contractors to adapt and apply 
the i r  capabi l i t ies  toward the solution of non-space problems. I n  such a 
scheme, both NASA and the non-aerospace acceptor of the technology would 
drop out of d i rec t  participation i n  the t ransfer  process. I n  addition, 
the following steps i n  the existing procedure would be eliminated or signi- 
f icant ly  reduced: reporting, screening, dissemination, and acceptance. 
What 
A program emphasizing contractor application of t he i r  capabili t ies 
i n  new non-aerospace areas has a number of other potent ia l  advantages. 
perception s tep becomes a main thrust  function rather  than a subordinate 
side issue.  
c a l l  fo r  new technologies t o  be reported. The incentive fo r  doing so  i s  
simply tha t  it i s  required t o  get main thrust  business with NASA. On the 
other hand, i f  contractors were encouraged to apply t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  
The 
Motivation fo r  t h i s  step now i s  negative, i . e . ,  the contracts 
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new markets, the perception s tep would become an  in tegra l  par t  of.the 
business operation. It could be a significant source of new product ideas 
and process improvements. Similar benefits  accrue to the adaptation step.  
Given a problem statement or market-need statement, the possessor of the 
resources i s  i n  the best  posit ion t o  adapt these resources t o  conformwith 
the requirements of the new non-aerospace market needs. I n  addition, the 
full weight of the contractor's potential  capabi l i t ies  can be brought to 
bear on the problem rather  than jus t  some element of the capabili ty which 
i s  reportable under the new technology clause. 
7 .  Diff icul ty  of Transferring Technology by Documents: Almost 
every character is t ic  and behavior t r a i t  associated w i t h  capabi l i t ies  argues 
against the effectiveness of transferring technology by some sort of 
document. The emphasis on personal communication between technical repre- 
sentatives of s e l l e r s  and buyers i s  a case i n  point. This se l l ing  technique 
evolved a t  l ea s t  i n  par t  because of the d i f f i cu l t i e s  of capabili ty expres- 
sion. 
par t ies .  This i s  extremely d i f f i cu l t  to reproduce i n  a writ ten document. 
A cer ta in  amount of give and take and empathy i s  required of the two 
Buyers and se l l e r s  i n  the aerospace f i e l d  have a t  leas t  two 
things going fo r  them that  are not available i n  a technology-transfer case 
( se l le r  i n  an aerospace industry and buyer i n  non-aerospace f i e l d ) .  
have a communityof in te res t ,  i . e . ,  aerospace, and speak the same o r  similar 
languages, i .e. ,  trade jargon. These factors assist the capabili ty market- 
ing and evaluation process i n  a nuniber of subtle but important ways. 
the case of technology t ransfer  from aerospace to non-aerospace, the buyers 
and se l l e r s  each have a different in te res t  area and speak different dialects .  
Some bridging of these gaps must be accomplished before effective comunica- 
t ion  of needs and capabi l i t ies  canbegin.  This i s  a formidable hurdle to 
get over i n  a two-way discussion. 
document (a one -way communication device) i s  even more dif  f i c h t  . 
They 
I n  
Surmounting t h i s  hurdle i n  a wri t ten 
Most documents prepared to t ransfer  technology are limited i n  
scope to descriptions of sub-elements of capabi l i t ies .  There are several 
valid reasons f o r  t h i s  scope l imitation; among them are the f ac t s  t ha t  (a) 
comprehensive capabi l i t ies  are  d i f f i c u l t  to express--briefly and effectively-- 
i n  writ ten form and (b) capabili ty statements are prepared w i t h  some specif ic  
objective i n  mind. These characterist ics of capabili ty expression are  i n  
d i rec t  conflict  w i t h  the objectives of the person preparing a t ransfer  docu- 
ment (Tech Brief , fo r  example). 
to be brief--so it w i l l  be read by recipients--and he wants it to have appeal 
for  a broad audience. The incompatibility between the wri ter ' s  objectives 
and the requirements of comprehensive capabili ty expression i s  resolved most 
often by l imiting the scope of t ransfer  documents t o  capabili ty sub-elements. 
The document wri ter  wants h i s  presentation 
.. . 
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Because significant problems (for  example, air-pollution control) 
i n  a l l  f i e l d s  are  complex, solutions will take the form of a ta i lored s e t  
of technologies specif ical ly  addressed t o  the problem at hand i n  much the 
same way tha t  aerospace capabi l i t ies  a re  combined t o  solve aerospace prob- 
lems. Transfer documents limited to descriptions of( > _ a b i l i t y  elements I 
do not provide solutions fo r  s ignif icant  problems--on 
Accordingly, such documents\ can only be eqec ted  t o  achieve small incremental 
t ransfers  even i f  they are  accepted. The achievement of more pro 
requires that the potent ia l  acceptor of the tendered element must 
tha t  it can be combined with the other elements he already possesses t o  form 
the se t  of technologies (capabili ty) required t o  solve a larger  problem. 
This is  a major barr ier  to significant /transfers*.. 
for  par t s  of solutions. 
Eramework for  Systematic Investigation Can Be Developed From 
A f i n a l  l i m i t  t o  t ransfer  by document stems from the predisposition 
of NASA contractors t o  seek technical solutions from t h e i r  suppliers or 
experts through some form of non-written communication. 
contractors disclosed tha t  t h i s  was invariably the f i rs t  s tep undertaken 
when a problem w a s  encountered. 
t o  various types of l i t e r a tu re  inquiry. Assuming tha t  firms i n  non-aerospace 
space f i e lds  behave the same way, then t h i s  impediment to t ransfer  by docu- 
ment ex is t s  i n  non-aerospace industry, 1 too&/ 
O u r  interviews with 
Only if  t h i s  f a i l ed  did contractors move 
Insights C. 
The findings of our investigation and our analysis of insights 
drawn from findings lead us t o  believe tha t  t ransfer  programs that  con- 
centrate on "demand pull" can be s ignif icant ly  more effect ive than programs 
keyed t o  "technology push." This i s  based on our assertion tha t  industry-- 
i n  par t icular  the aerospace industry--is be t te r  equipped t o  seek out re le-  
vant technology than it is  t o  identify new problems t o  which technologies 
can be addressed. In  addition, technology advance, per se, is not /rewarded 
i n  our market system. Instead, the rewazds come from the sa t i s fac t ion  of 
market demand./ Accordingly, firms seek out and apply technology only a f t e r  
a demand has been ident i f ied.  
- 1/ This assumption is  verified by a recent Denver Research Report; see: 
John S. Gilmore, e t  a l . ,  The Channels of Technology Acquisition i n  
Comereid '  Firms. and the NASA Dissemination Program, NASA Contractor 
Report-MSA CR-790, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
WashingtoD, D.C., June, 1967. 
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This view i s  not unique with us.  Schumpeter,-l/ f o r  example, 
wrote along these l ines  30 years ago, 
i s  among the leaders of a growing band of researchers s t ress ing the domi- 
nance of "demand pull." 
and Technology Transfer," a f t e r  reviewing the writings of Schumpeter and 
Schmookler, makes the following coment: 
More recently, Jacob Schmooklerg 
Dick Carpenter i n  h i s  recent study "Policy Planning 
"These studies lead t o  an economic theory which suggests t ha t  
deficiencies i n  economic growth via technological change are more 
related t o  inadequate ident i f icat ion of demands and choices among 
conflicting wants and needs. 
stimulates invention i s  relegated t o  the secondary importance by 
"he long-held /impression t h a t  science 
t h i s  analysis. ll3f 
IIn the same report, Bat te l le  Memorial I n s t i t u t e  follows t h i s  statement up 
i n  i t s  lcome& on the strength and weaknesses of Federal Transfer Programs: 
"Dissemination based on solution ident i f icat ion followed by 
attempts t o  locate problems, tends tolinundate a recipient and 
render him/somewhat insensit ive.  
resu l t  of an outgrowth of technology from mission-oriented agencies. 
The weahess resu l t s  from fa i lu re  t o  recognize that effect ive trans- 
f e r  can be accomplished only by reversal  of the present process, 
namely t o  seek ou t  problems and then solve them from available tech- 
This type of dissemination i s  the 
nology or match technology t o  appropriate problems or needs. l4J 
Nelson, Peck, and Kalacheck a l so  emphasize demand i n  t h e i r  analysis of 
technological advance: 
"Two broad factors  a re  a t  work. F i r s t ,  there are  differences 
and changes i n  the rewards from part icular  kinds of technological 
advance--demand factors that stimulate or repress e f for t s  aimed a t  
achieving them. 
of relevant components and materials, and of knowledge, and i n  
Second, there a re  differences i n  changes i n  a stock 
- 1/ Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Theory of Economic Development," Harvard Economic 
Studies, XLVI, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1934, Harvard University Press. 
Jacob Schmookler, "Invention and Economic Growth," Cambridge , Massachusetts , 
Harvard University Press, 1966. 
"Policy Planning f o r  Technology f o r  Technology Transfer," a report of the 
Subcommittee on Science and Technology t o  the  Committee on Small  Busi- 
ness , United States  Senate, Washington, I U. S . Governmgnt Printing O f f  ice , 
1967, p. 57. ., p. 174. 
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the number of people who possess the relevant knowledge--supply 
factors  which permit or r e s t r i c t  cer ta in  kinds of advances."Y 
Thus it seems tha t  our  findings are  i n  basic agreement with those 
of other researchers. 
programs aimed a t  accelerating "demand pull" i n  general, and i n  par t icular  
how t o  obtain the most leverage from such programs. Accordingly, we sug- 
gest  t ha t  NASA consider a se r ies  of p i l o t  or experimental programs designed 
t o  enlarge prac t ica l  knowledge about means f o r  exploiting the role of de- 
mand i n  technology transfer.* 
following hypothesized description of the technology u t i l i za t ion  process. 
The problem remains, however, as  t o  how t o  design 
To f a c i l i t a t e  t h i s  study, we propose the 
D. Hyyothesis--The Technology Uti l izat ion Process 
Investigation of the role of demand i n  technology u t i l i za t ion  
requires tha t  studies a lso give recognition to  other elements i n  the 
process. If t h i s  is  not done, it would be extremely d i f f i c u l t  to i so la te  
Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kalacheck, "Technology 
Economic Growth and Public Policy." Washington, D. C., The Brookings 
Ins t i t u t e ,  1967, p. 28. 
zation programs. A l l  operate t o  accelerate the 1 "natural technology 
diffusion process," b u t  each d i f f e r s  i n  the point a t  which leverage 
i s  applied and the direction of the force exerted. The f i rs t  approach 
i s  the now familiar Technology Push, i n  which reported new NASA tech- 
nology i s  channeled t o  potent ia l  non-space users through such devices 
as  Tech Brief announcements. The second i s  Demand Pu l l  linked1 d i -  
r ec t ly  with the search of technology. The Biomedical Applications 
Team programs are  the prime operating example. A medical problem or 
need i s  ident i f ied,  the technical solution requirements a re  specified, 
and space technology i s  searched fo r  a solution. The th i rd  approach 
uses Pure Demand Pull .  Like the preceding, t h i s  starts with problem 
ident i f icat ion and technical solution requirement specification. 
the market potent ia l  i s  estimated and t h i s  t o t a l  information package 
i s  disseminated to industry. With the need properly defined and the 
market opportunity delineated, private industry will be motivated t o  
apply the most appropriate technology to solution of the problem. 
Industry i s ,  thus, responsible f o r  the application of i t s  s k i l l s  to 
the problem (market opportunity). 
team to achieve d i rec t  linkages between problems and the reported body 
of NASA technology. 
* Our findings disclose a t  l ea s t  three possible ty-pes of Technology U t i l i -  
Next, 
There i s  no attempt by the project 
It i s  t h i s  last approach tha t  we/ suggest be ex- 
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the impact of demand forces. 
B u t t n e r  and Cheaneyy and t o  a lesser  extent the work of Churchill and 
Ozinne .g 
Our hnothes is  draws heavily on the work of 
We see three major elements i n  the technology u t i l i za t ion  process. 
They are: needs, technology, and organizational factors .  These elements 
ac t  t o  shape the direction and ra te  of technology u t i l i za t ion .  
these elements are subject t o  some degree of manipulation and a l te ra t ion  on 
the par t  of organizations such as NASA concerned with the acceleration of 
the process. 
I n  turn, 
I n  our analysis we see needs--actual demand, l a t en t  demand, and 
the stimulus--as the dominant controlling element i n  the short run. For 
example, the need f o r  air pollution control, i n  existence f o r  some time, 
has only recently been articulated.  
addressed t o  t h i s  need, and la ten t  demand fo r  a number of other 
undeveloped or unadapted devices or  techniques for  reducing a i r  pollution. 
There i s  actual  demand now for  devices 
as yet 
Several need-related requirements must be met i f  we itre t o  exer- 
cise control and direction over technological advance. Needs must be 
recognized. They must have a t t rac t ive  market potent ia l .  They must be 
translatable in to  technical solution requirements. And, t h i s  information 
must be comunicated t o  industr ia l  firms with l a t en t  capabi l i t ies  which 
may be organized t o  solve the problems associated with air pollution. 
The second element operative i n  the technology u t i l i za t ion  process 
i s  technology, i . e . ,  the supply of s k i l l s ,  resources, e t c .  t ha t  can be 
applied t o  need sat isfact ion.  I n  the case of technology t ransfer ,  the basic 
premise i s  tha t  the technologies now being used fo r  one purpose can a l so  
be used f o r  another. We believe tha t  t h i s  reapplication of the technologies 
requires tha t  they be adapted and restructured t o  meet the par t icular  re- 
quirements of the new use. This process i s  analogous t o  the exis t ing process 
which NASA contractors go through i n  reforming t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  i n  response 
t o  a new NASA project opportunity. 
quires tha t  they be linked t o  the new need, and tha t  they be'regrouped t o  
sa t i s fy  the new need. 
The adaptation of the technologies re- 
H. Buttner and E, S. Cheaney, "Models of Technological Change," presented 
a t  the Annual Technology and Management Conference, Lake Placid, New 
York, May 22-25, 1967. 
A 
Potential  Tool fo r  Improving Technology Transfer," The National Confer- 
ence on Technology Uti l izat ion and Economic Growth, July 30-August 4, 
1967, Aerospace Research Applications Center, Indiana University. 
G. A .  Churchill and U. B. Ozinne, "Adoption and Diffusion Research: 
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Organizational factors--the th i rd  element--.are concerned w i t h  
company character is t ics ,  goals, organizational structure,  procedures, and 
related factors  that define the ins t i tu t ions  operating i n  the technology- 
u t i l i za t ion  process. 
the relevant technology (technology se l l e r )  and companies serving the rele- 
vant market (technology buyers) tha t  ac t  to impede or to accelerate technology 
diffusion and application. 
s e l l e r  are: 
adapt to the requirements of serving the new market, i . e . ,  discard organiza- 
t iona l  and procedural character is t ics  it acquired to serve the N M A  market 
and adopt new characterist ics required t o  serve the new non-aerospace market; 
the firm must revise i t s  view of i t s e l f  and i t s  objectives; and t o  accomplish 
a l l  these things, the f i r m  should be provided w i t h  incentive t o  do so. 
They are characterist ids of the companies possessing 
Some of the factors  re la t ing t o  the technology 
the f i r m  must perceive the market opportunity; the f i r m  must 
Organizational factors re la ted to the technology buyer are essen- 
t i a l l y  the reverse of those associated w i t h  the technology s e l l e r .  The 
technology buyer must perceive the technologies required i n  serving i ts  
market, par t icular ly  with respect t o  emerging market needs and new technolo- 
g ica l  ways of sat isfying these needs. It must adapt procedures, organiza- 
t ions,  and s o  on to accommodate the new technologies. It also must revise 
its view of i t s e l f  and i t s  goals. 
take these steps, i . e . ,  significant new market potential .  
And it must have the incentive to under- 
It i s  our view tha t  t h i s  hypothesis provides a s ta r t ing  point 
for  an examination of the roles  of these three elements and the i r  sub- 
elements i n  the technology u t i l i za t ion  process. Tests of the hypothesis 
should provide a structured understanding of the process, ident i fy  those 
points i n  the process where greatest  leverage can be obtained by technology 
u t i l i za t ion  stimulating programs, and provide experience with various pract i -  
ca l  techniques fo r  exerting leverage. 
V I .  CONCLUSIONS AND RECCMMENDATIONS 
A .  Recommendations Concerning Implications for  Technology Util ization 
A s  a resu l t  of our findings concerning the nature of capabi l i t ies  
and our analysis of the associated implications for  Technology Util ization, 
we make the following recommendations: 
1. Efforts to develop clearer understandings of the technology- 
t ransfer  process, which the Office of Technology Uti l izat ion is  attempting 
to ac t  upon, should be continued. 
f o r  such studies i s  available from our hypothesized description of the 
W e  suggest that a structured framework 
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transfer process (p. 39) plus the conceptual systems model of technological 
innovation recently developed by Ellis Mottur .r/ 
2. Efforts to identify interesting, new, unique capabilities 
possessed by NASA contractors are in order, 
capabilities should be subjected to study to establish how they came into 
being. The scope of these investigations should include the timing, in- 
vestment, and decision-making factors associated with the development and 
exploitation of the capabilities. An objective of these studies should 
be to determine ways to expand the small fraction of capabilities now re- 
ported to TU for dissemination, Critical incident analysis would be an 
excellent methodology for these investigations. 
When identified, some of these 
3. Most important, the "demand pull" approach to Technology 
Utilization should receive great emphasis. Existing programs following this 
approach should be augmented, and new programs should be put into effect. 
In general, the approach requires the identification of non-space problems 
(transfer opportunities), market-potential estimation, and dissemination of 
this information to both potential users and possessors of aerospace-developed 
capabilities .g ( See pages 30 through 36 for specific action suggestions. ) 
The Office of Technology Utilization should take steps to involve 
other mission agencies, industry associations, and foundations in a series 
of programs to implement this recommendation. These steps would be in addi- 
tion to the Office's current technology identification and dissemination 
functions. The analytical techniques developed by Dr. Peter Castrucio for 
the ORL Experimental Program provide a model methodology for the conduct of 
the market-identification function .g 
( non-space transfer opportunity) information should be disseminated through 
existing channels. 
To the extent possible the market 
lf Ellis Mottur, The Processes of Technolopica1 Innovation: A Conceptual 
Systems Model. a study sponsored by the National Bureau of Standards 
and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (forthcoming). 
this type. See: "Utilization of Federal Laboratories," a report of 
the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Developent of the Cokittee 
on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninetieth 
Con&ess, Second Session, Washington, GPO, 1968, p. 60-61, 
February, 1966. 
Dr.'Donald M. MacArthur has also called for and outlined a program of 
IBM, ORL Experimental Program, NASA Contractor Report NASA CR-70348, 
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4. Finally, case studies of NASA contractors who have attempted 
to t ransfer  t h e i r  capabi l i t ies  to the c iv i l ian  sector can provide knowledge 
about the specif ic  types of bar r ie rs  encountered, and can additionally 
identify leverage points for  TU action. The current t ransfer  e f fo r t s  
associated with the Rockwell-Standard/North America Aviation merger pro- 
vide an excellent specif ic  case-study opportunity. 9 
B. Conclusions and Recommendations f o r  a NASA Capabilities Center 
Concerning establishment of a Capabilities Center the investiga- 
tors conclude : 
1. Broad purpose Multi-Client Capabilities F i les  present d i f f i -  
cu l t ies  and costs which outweigh the present need fo r  such centralized 
systems. 
2. The nature and format of capabi l i t ies  information used ( a )  
f o r  nw-procurement purposes and (b) to locate rare  or  scarce skills, while 
differ ing i n  form and content, could be made compatible i n  an associative 
f i l e  . 
3 .  Attempting to combine i n  the same f i l e  the re la t ive ly  well 
standardized capabi l i t ies  t ha t  are stated,  c lass i f ied,  and coded f o r  procure- 
ment purposes w i t h  more specialized descriptions of unusual o r  unique capa- 
b i l i t i e s  would great ly  enlarge the f i l e  size,  and introduce confl ic ts  i n  
searching procedures . 
4. Any NASA contractor-capability f i l e  created to serve Technology 
Uti l izat ion should be designed and developed f o r  tha t  audience and i t s  pur- 
poses of use alone; not fo r  program offices or other agencies, and assuredly 
not f o r  procurement use. 
would be primarily oriented toward monitoring the emergence, and the spread- 
ing of aerospace technology, and toward association of technology and needs. 
Usage of such a f i l e  by Technology Uti l izat ion 
5. To be pract ical ,  a Technology Uti l izat ion Division f i l e  of 
capabi l i t ies  should be kept small and highly specialized. This constraint 
i s  suggested i n  par t  because of the experimental nature of the index coding, 
f i l e  structure,  and associative searching methods which would be needed. 
Even more compelling, however, i s  the need of the TU division to be concerned 
w i t h  p e r h p s  the top one percent of tednnological capabilities--that on the 
leading edge of change. 
1/ See: "Piping Technology Toward New Goals," Business Week, July 27, 1968, 
pp. 108-112. 
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6. The most a t t r ac t ive  and potent ia l ly  useful form of contractor 
capabi l i t ies  f i l e  appears to be one concerned exclusively with novel, rare, 
new, or unique a b i l i t i e s  t o  solve problems. A select ive f i l e  indexing i n  
depth, perhaps no more than 3,000 capabi l i t ies  of from 500 to 1,000 NASA 
contractors, is envisioned. 
7 .  Building a f i l e  of unique, rare,  or new capabi l i t ies  would 
However; it is  _worth noting that a t  the 1 s t  
This i s  especially t rue where the 
require types of information not now available i n  inventories of conventional 
s k i l l s  or procurement f i l e s .  
of newly evolved capability-injbeing, most contractors are will ing t o  supply 
the necessary information on request. 
organization possessing a new capabili ty i s  not sure how or whether i t s  
further exploitation f i t s  t h e i r  company goals and markets. 
8. Raw information furnished by contractors should be4processed 
t o  provide the following f i l e  inputs and outputs: 
a. Specific s k i l l s  by name 
b. Related a b i l i t i e s  by functional or re lated classes 
e. Indicators of r a r i t y  or uniqueness 
d.  Indicators of newness or date of f i r s t  use 
e .  Association or clumping by problem solved 
f .  Association by markets served or applications 
g .  Indicators of usefulness,, value, benefit  
h. Organization possessing such s k i l l s  
i. Internal check4 f o r  va l id i ty  or verif icat ion 
Aggregative outputs would include the number of different  s k i l l s  
inventoried, the number of classes, and the number of organizations repre- 
sented, together with the number of ra re  s k i l l s  they possess. 
The information should be capable of different ia t ion with respect 
Thus, a valuable output w i l l  belmeasures of growth ;ate and t o  time. 
diffusion of technology (plus, hopefully, indications of benefit ,  impact, 
and value). 
Some of the ways by which such a specialized capabi l i t ies  f i l e  
could a s s i s t  i n  the work of TU are shown i n  Chart 3. 
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CHART 3 
HOW REGISTRY OF RclRE CAPABILITIES W O W  AID TU 
TU Functions Nature of Information Needed 
Monitoring of Technological 1. Individual s k i l l s  by name and by class 
2. Number of different  s k i l l s  inventoried 
Capabilities 
3. Indication of r a r i t y  or  uniqueness 
4. Ident i ty  of organizations having 
each s k i l l  
5. Numbers of organizations represented 
(information different ia ted with 
respect to time) 
Support Technology Studies 
and Documentation 
Applications Matching 
Document Benefits Impact, 
Jus t i f ica t ion  
1. Ski l l s  associated or clumped together 
2 .  Measures of growth r a t e  o r  diffusion 
3 .  1s technology at stage appropriate 
fo r  documentation, analysis , o r  
t ransfer  e f for t?  
1. Basic functions performed 
2. Problem solved by capabili ty 
3. Analogous skil ls ,functions,  and 
problems 
4. Ident i ty  of groups highly qualified 
a t  s k i l l  
1. Indicators of importance or usefulness 
2. Indicators of benefit  or  impact 
3 .  Indicators of news in te res t  (should 
be quantified by numbers, dollars,  
o r  emotional value) 
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